Why they kill : criminal etiologies in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, R.L. Stevenson's Strange case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and Oscar Wilde's The picture of Dorian Gray by Léger-St-Jean, Marie
 
Direction des bibliothèques 
 
 
 
AVIS 
 
Ce document a été numérisé par la Division de la gestion des documents et 
des archives de l’Université de Montréal. 
 
L’auteur a autorisé l’Université de Montréal à reproduire et diffuser, en totalité 
ou en partie, par quelque moyen que ce soit et sur quelque support que ce 
soit, et exclusivement à des fins non lucratives d’enseignement et de 
recherche, des copies de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse.  
 
L’auteur et les coauteurs le cas échéant conservent la propriété du droit 
d’auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent ce document. Ni la thèse ou le 
mémoire, ni des extraits substantiels de ce document, ne doivent être 
imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l’autorisation de l’auteur.  
 
Afin de se conformer à la Loi canadienne sur la protection des 
renseignements personnels, quelques formulaires secondaires, coordonnées 
ou signatures intégrées au texte ont pu être enlevés de ce document. Bien 
que cela ait pu affecter la pagination, il n’y a aucun contenu manquant. 
 
NOTICE 
 
This document was digitized by the Records Management & Archives 
Division of Université de Montréal. 
 
The author of this thesis or dissertation has granted a nonexclusive license 
allowing Université de Montréal to reproduce and publish the document, in 
part or in whole, and in any format, solely for noncommercial educational and 
research purposes. 
 
The author and co-authors if applicable retain copyright ownership and moral 
rights in this document. Neither the whole thesis or dissertation, nor 
substantial extracts from it, may be printed or otherwise reproduced without 
the author’s permission. 
 
In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms, contact 
information or signatures may have been removed from the document. While 
this may affect the document page count, it does not represent any loss of 
content from the document.  
 
 
 
Université de Montréal 
Why They Kill: 
Criminal Etiologies in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, 
R.L. Stevenson 's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and 
Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray 
par 
Marie Léger-St-Jean 
Département d'études anglaises 
Faculté des arts et sciences 
Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures 
en vue de l'obtention du grade de M.A. 
en études anglaises 
Juin, 2009 
© Marie Léger-St-Jean, 2009 
", 
Université de Montréal 
Faculté des études supérieures 
Ce mémoire intitulé : 
Why They Kill: Criminal Etiologies in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, R.L. Stevenson's 
Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray 
présenté par : 
Marie Léger-St-Jean 
a été évalué par un jury composé des personnes suivantes: 
Taiwo Adetunji Osinubi, président-rapporteur 
Michael Eberle-Sinatra, directeur de recherche 
Andrew John Miller, membre du jury 
Résumé 
Ce mémoire réunit trois classiques de la littérature britannique du XIXe siècle 
(Frankenstein de Mary Shelley, Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde de Robert Louis 
Stevenson et The Picture of Dorian Gray d'Oscar Wilde) pour rendre compte de la façon 
dont les personnages s'expliquent le comportement des meurtriers. La comparaison entre 
une analyse textuelle de leur opinion et du discours social contemporain clarifie 
l'argumentation des personnages et met en évidence comment l'oeuvre s'inscrit dans les 
débats de l'époque sur l'altérité du criminel et la laideur comme marqueur du mal. 
Frankenstein met en scène deux discours concurrents en matière de criminalité: les 
préjugés physiognomoniques et la révolte succédant à l'ostracisme. Dans Dr Jekyll and 
Mr Hyde, les spéculations physiognomoniques d'Utterson situent Hyde à la frontière de 
l'humanité alors que Jekyll parvient à la même conclusion après s'être d'abord identifié à 
son alter ego. Dorian Gray, la quintessence de la physiognomonie, déploie une panoplie 
diversifiée de discours: une analyse de classes, une opposition entre influence et nature 
intrinsèque ainsi que le déterminisme comme source de déresponsabilisation. L'examen de 
multiples versions des oeuvres (ébauches, manuscrits et différentes éditions) rappelle 
continuellement la fluidité et la richesse du texte. 
Mots-clés: XIxe siècle, littérature britannique, criminels, Frankenstein, Strange Case of 
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, physiognomonie, criminologie, 
psychologie 
Abstract 
This thesis brings together three classics of British nineteenth-century literature -
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and 
Mr Hyde, and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray - to assess how fictional 
characters make sense of murderers. Close reading of their positions compared to 
contemporary social discourse clarifies the characters' arguments and examines how the 
work engaged with concomitant debates about the criminal as Other and the ugly as evil. 
Frankenstein showcases two competing discourses on crirninality: physiognomic prejudice 
and revolt from social exclusion. In Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Utterson's physiognornic 
speculations classify Hyde as barely human while Jekyll cornes to a similar conclusion after 
having frrst identified with rus alter ego. Dorian Gray, the epitome of physiognomy, 
displays a variety of discourses: a class-based analysis, an opposition between influence 
and true nature, and determinism leading to unaccountability. Examination of multiple 
versions of the works - drafts, manuscripts, and different published editions - constantly 
rernind of the text's instability and richness. 
Keywords : 19th century, British literature, Criminals, Frankenstein, Strange Case of 
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, Physiognomy, Criminology, 
Psychology 
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Introduction 
UA marbidfascinatian with crime seems ta number 
amang the basic hum an traits, and writers thraugh the 
centuries have never been slaw ta gratify this taste in 
apprapriate literary farms. " 
Theodore Ziolkowski, "A Portrait of the Artist as Criminal" 
Criminality, at all ages, though to varying degrees, creates anxiety in society. Any 
phenomenon to which no cause can be ascribed breeds worry. Disquiet cannot be endured: 
an explanation must be provided. Rationality identifies causal relations to make sense of the 
world's apparent and distressful chaos. Once pinpointed, society can hopefully manage 
collectively to bridle the circumstances from which the phenomenon emanates. In the 
nineteenth century, Western societies' ability to explain the physical world seemed quite 
satisfactory and encouraging. However, confidence waned as social relations and the 
metaphysics of the mind failed to yield effective laws to positivism's enquiries. 
Criminal retiologies - from the Greek airia, "cause, reason" - participate in the 
soothing se arch for meaning (OED). Today, we are acquainted with representations of the 
cri minaI as Other - the poor, the uneducated, the immigrant - a very comforting view for 
those who escape stigmatization: they need not fear to turn one day into a threatening 
criminal. Nevertheless, creating Others as scapegoats does not dispel anxiety, but simply 
shifts it to a wariness of those targeted. The CUITent eagerness to underscore the criminal's 
Otherness contrasts sharply with the prevalent view in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
England, according to which universal human depravity caused crime. It cornes as quite a 
surprise to twenty-first century readers, habitually presented with criminals fairly different 
from them, to be wamed against human depravity, which slumbers in each and everyone. 
Yet convicts displayed on the gallows as examples were understood to be but this invisible 
yet omnipresent danger's unfortunate victims. Three hundred years ago, social dis course 
held human nature - in all its fallibility, not its anomalies - responsible for criminality. 
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The Genevese philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1712-1778) challenge to 
the prevailing pessimism regarding human nature retains the universal criterion: all 
human beings are born good, society corrupts them. A number of Romantics have adopted 
and expressed his perspective, from the German Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) in Der 
Verbrecher aus verlorner Ehre (1786) to the Frenchman Victor Hugo (1802-1885) in Les 
Misérables (1862). They address deviance from a socio-psychological point of view, 
dissecting the criminal mind, a paramount example of which is Crime and 
Punishment (1866) by the Russian Fyodor Dostoyevsky's (1821-1881) . These examples of 
humanized criminals run counter to nineteenth-century social discourse, set upon 
circumscribing first the criminal classes, and eventually the criminal man. As alterity 
displaces universal humanity, fearing the Other replaces brooding anxieties about becoming 
a criminal. 
*** 
In Surveiller et punir: la naissance des prisons, Michel Foucault theorizes that at 
the tum of the nineteenth century, the advent of a disciplinary society transferred 
punishment's hitch point from the body to the soul and that of judgement from the crime to 
the criminal's soul. Into this "âme," he fits "des passions, des instincts, des anomalies, des 
infirmités, des inadaptations, des effets de milieu ou d'hérédité" (23). A confusing 
terminological choice, hence, but his analysis of criminal justice transposing its scope from 
an act to a being can be compelling: "on punit des agressions, mais à travers elles des 
agressivités; des viols, mais en même temps des perversions; des meurtres qui sont aussi 
des pulsions et des désirs" (23). Foucault aims to explain the widespread introduction of 
detention as punishment between the eighteenth and nineteenth century - and the fact that it 
was maintained despite unremitting criticism. His argument revolves around the emergence 
of discipline as "un type de pouvoir, une modalité de l'exercer" (217). He identifies three 
punitive technologies: corporal punishment under monarchy, 'humanized' punishment -
seeking the most effective representation to impress the social body - in projected penal 
code reforms, and the prison system in their perverted application. He reads criminology, 
and any form ofknowledge, as a part of a vast controlling apparatus. 
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Theories of criminal behaviour also reveal assumptions regarding human nature. 
The Classical school of penology, spear-headed by the ltalian Cesare Beccaria (1738-
1794) and the Englishman Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) conceived crime as a rational act, 
like aIl human actions. The consequent remedy was thought to be the systematic 
enforcement of a punishment slightly superior to the gain found in infringing upon the law. 
Penal code reforms took into account this principle, with only meagre results. Rationality as 
a common human denominator was perhaps a flawed assumption: universality was thence 
breached, allowing for the criminal to become an Other. Under the pretext of explaining his 
or her act, normative concepts started circulating between legal and me di cal discourse and 
entered the courtroom, supposed to simply assign responsibility, to judge mental 
constitutions. According to Foucault, sentences now offer "une appréciation de normalité," 
normalizing being the disciplinary power regime's "art de punir" (25, 185). Yet, by 
studying criminal deviations from the norm, the burgeoning science of criminology was 
inevitably (re)defining human nature. 
The concept of "human nature" draws a border between human and inhuman 
conduct, a fine line which fluctuates from one culture to another. In Western societies, this 
normative construct excluded until recently homosexuality from natural desires and 
practices, and still rejects paedophilia, necrophilia, bestiality, etc. A normal human being 
would not be driven by such impulses, would not commit such acts. Another example: 
social dis course currently tends to normalize mental illnesses. Nevertheless, while 
depression has become an unfortunate yet almost natural stage in life, heavier conditions 
such as schizophrenia and psychopathic personalities remain stigmatized as abnormal, as 
unnatural human conditions. Unfortunately, the constructed nature of a concept can too 
easily be employed to negate the reality it aims to describe. 
Many social and literary critics allow precedence to concepts' construction over 
their content. Consequently, their relation to power seems to be the only raison d'être for 
so-called 'social constructs' such as human nature, poverty, criminality, and insanity. 
Hence, Foucault describes the advent of criminology as enabling the double-headed hydra 
of power and knowledge to grasp, to construct a "prise justifiable" on the criminal (24). 
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This "assujettissement" turned humans into an "objet de savoir pour un discours à statut 
" scientifique"," bodies into a "force utile" (28, 29, 30). His interpretation, with its 
myopic focus on power struggles, is just as reductive as one that would exclude the 
concept's socio-historical context. 
Science's existence within social discourse does not disqualify its reference to an 
underlying reality. Discourse analyst Marie-Christine Leps reads Doctor Henry Jekyll 's 
discovery "that man is not truly one, but truly two," in Robert Louis Stevenson's classic 
nove lIa, as a manifestation that "human nature as a monolithic entity" is a "product of 
social conventions" rather than the "adequate expreSsion of a preexistent reality" (EUP 59; 
Leps 207). Her opposition is oversimplified. Indeed, agreement between the "expression of 
a preexistent reality" and "social conventions" does not encourage scientists to calI into 
question the former. However, Jekyll's revelation can serv.e to perfect the "expression," the 
model, rather than to dismiss it as a mere "product." Indeed, how are we to research and 
discuss the underlying reality - to make sense of it - if not through constructs? Old-
fashioned, 1 maintain that science produces models that best represent a phenomenon given 
the available knowledge and the ideological constraints. Changes in the latter and the 
collection of new data which the model cannot explain will respectively provoke its ethical 
revaluation and its epistemological collapse. 
*** 
Beyond, or rather before the allegories, there is a first level to a text, ri ch in 
historical information. Literary studies, when analysing past works set in a time 
contemporary to their writing, can inform social history and assist in assessing the range of 
possible thoughts available to individuals on various political, economic, religious, and 
social issues in a given culture. Social discourse - the sum of linguistic utterances, \witten 
and oral, pictorial representations, and moving images circulated in mass communication -
yields the most pragmatic approximation of the limits of the thinkable. The adjective 
'social' does not mean that 'society' produces the discourse, transcendentally inserting 
meaning into the social body. Only individuals can produce meaning: they make sense of 
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what they observe in their physical existence through idiosyncratic theories influenced 
by what they read and hear - texts which are products of other individuals, not of 
society. Discourse, whether argumentative or artistic (if such distinctions are necessary), 
flows between producers and receivers which respectively encode and decode meaning, 
with the possible transmutations the process entails. 
ln the nineteenth century, social discourse can be divided into three subcategories: 
general public discourse - recorded in newspapers, periodicals, political speeches, and 
publicity; specialized discourses - found in legal, medical, scientific, etc. articles and 
treatises; and artistic products - including literary works, theatre performances, paintings, 
and sculptures. 1 The actual encoding and decoding, which communication studies examine 
empirically, are very hard to access with past discourses: aIl that is left is the text. They can 
nonetheless be inferred by seeking intertextual comparisons within contemporary social 
discourse. 
ln his introduction to an article on Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray, 
Joseph Carroll claims that literature has always offered "subjectively evocative depictions 
of human nature," though the 1970s poststructuralist revolution has suppressed the concept 
and lead literary critics "to speak of authors, characters, settings, and plots not as 
individuals situated in a natural world but as discursive formations constituted by the 
circulation of linguistic, cultural, and ideological energies" (286). 1 opt for a return to the 
former: reading characters' speech and thoughts as expressions of an individuality 
constrained by the frames ofthought contemporary to both the work's setting and writing-
keeping in mind that they may be hypocritical or unreliably reported by the narrator. One 
must nevertheless remember that, just as no author can avoid anachronism at sorne point 
when representing personal thoughts and social interactions of centuries past, no reader, 
including the literary scholar, can ever totally escape his or her own context. 
These divisions come across, coincidentally, as generalizations of the three sections in Leps 's 
Apprehending the Crimina/: "Criminology," "The Press," and "Literature." 1 chanced upon her 
extraordinarily interesting study while researching my doctoral project last summer. 1 consequently 
realized that she had already written my dissertation and that 1 needed to fmd a new project. 
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The pervasive sexually-oriented interpretation of the Gothic genre is such an 
example. Hollywood and psychoanalysis have anachronistically imposed sexual 
readings of the Gothic, but refuse to acknowledge evil as its underlying basis. Though it 
can manifest itself through deviant sexuality, the ultimate threat of the Gothic is the 
existence of uncontrollable evil, invading the world supematurally from without - an 
allegory of immigration? - or, even more dreadful, stemming from within human beings. 
Furthermore, the essence of Gothic is the inexplicable. Hence, as Donald Lawler states in 
the conclusion of his article on Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, "to 
organize, complete, or resolve the narrative is, resthetically, to escape the nightmare of the 
gothic world" ("Reframing Jekyll and Hyde" 251). Hollywood, at least <Îuring its classical 
. period, endlessly delivered neatly unravelled mysteries. Literary criticism should serve to 
remind of a text's open-endedness, rather than seeking psychoanalytical resolutions which 
triumph over and dismiss mystical and transcendental fictional realities. 
Within this set of presuppositions (there is a reality beneath dis course, meaning is 
produced by individual subjectivities, Gothic literature stages uncontrollable and 
inexplicable evil) and personal preferences (reading the text literally, understanding 
readings contemporary to the text) , this thesis aims to identify the conflicting views on 
criminality set forth within a text and analyse the narrative resolution of this battle of 
subjectivities. Characters voice certain positions (liable to evolve in the course of the 
narrative) likely to be found elsewhere in social discourse: close reading will reveal 
correspondences. These may shed light on elements that the author and the contemporary 
audience might have taken for granted, clarifying the character's argument. More 
importantly, they indicate how the work engages with contemporary debates, embedding it 
bidirectionally in social discourse. To dispel a certain text fetishization which intense close 
reading is likely to conjure, l compare multiple versions of the works: different published 
editions, but also drafts and manuscripts. The critic and its scholarly readers are thus 
reminded of the text's instability and richness. 
*** 
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Foucault presents a short and segmented literary history of criminal narratives 
scattered in different sections of his Surveiller et punir. He fust describes how 
nineteenth-century literature's "monstruosité des forts et des puissants" replaced the 
subversive "gloire du malfaiteur rustique," found in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
criminal biographies, turning crime into a "privilège exclusif' for those "qui sont 
réellement grands" (72). The philosopher rightly analyzes criminal biographies as both 
moralizing (in their propagandizing exemplary quality) and subversive (in their 
glorification of popular resistance): the hero carries, "sous la morale apparente de 
l'exemple à ne pas suivre, toute une mémoire de luttes et d'affrontements" (70). However, 
\ 
in Foucault's discussion of gallows speeches, he considers only, or so it seems, condemned 
highwaymen. 
Certain criminal biographies introduce causality while others focus on the criminal's 
adventurous life. In his sociopoetical analysis of British criminal biographies, Lincoln B. 
FalIer identifies two distinct narrative formulas: the fust attempts to make sense of familial 
murder by invoking a spiritual retiology and the other, originating from the picaresque 
tradition, recounts the life of highwaymen in a disparate tale devoid of any attempt to 
rationalize their behaviour (3-5, 194-195). The former category might not have existed in 
France, which would explain Foucault's oversight, but it was certainly present in the 
German States since similar gallows speeches inspired Schiller's poem "Die 
Kindsmorderin" (1782). The first-person narration, a young mother's last words before 
being executed for having killed her own bastard child, recalls the tropes of familial murder 
criminal biographies with its insistence on weakness and human fallibility. Biographers 
exposed criminal retiologies as early as 300 years ago. 
Foucault associates biography as a technique to psychological causality as a 
discourse. He constructs the "appareil pénitentiaire" as displaying an interest in the 
"délinquant'''s life whereas pre-disciplinary 'justice pénale" concentrated strictly on the 
illegal act committed (258). Foucault correlates the establishment of a "réseau de causalité" 
and the "introduction du « biographique »" at the end of the eighteenth century (256, 255). 
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century cri minaI biographies disrupt his neat reciprocal 
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relationship. On the one hand, highwaymen's life tales, though biographical, did not 
defme any causality. On the other hand, the existence of criminal biographies 
promoting an retiology (based on human depravity) well before Foucault situates the rise of 
the disciplinary society fatally undermines his argument on a European scale (again, they 
may not have existed in France). AlI in alI, the philosopher reports that criminal biographies 
glorified lower-class criminals under the monarchy and claims later, in blatant 
contradiction, thae the newly-introduced biographical writing to which criminals were 
subjected enabled the post-penal reform disciplinary society to circumscribe the 
"délinquant" beyond the "infracteur." 
Chronological contradictions abound in Foucault's attempt to wrmg from 
nineteenth-century fiction a move into upper-class criminality. Again, a later segment 
introduces contradictions. Indeed, declaring that cri minaI novels stressed the "étrangeté" of 
crime (as opposed to the "fait divers" which underscored its proximity), he suggests that 
mid-century seriaIs such as Eugène Sue's Les Mystères de Paris (1842-1843) and Pierre 
Ponson du Terrail's Rocambole (1859-1884) depicted the lowest-class sIums ("bas-fonds") 
as a site of strangeness (292). Thence, the powerful and privileged men did not entirely rob 
the people of its "ancien orgueil de ses crimes" (72). Lower-class criminals are still 
represented in nineteenth-century popular literature across Europe. 
His portrait of higher-class criminals representations - works presenting murder as a 
fine art succeeded by detective novels - is equally sketchy. For the first category, he gives 
only two exarnples, a "roman noir à Quincey" (either his short-story The Avenger [1838] or 
his essay Murder Considered as one of the Fine Arts [1827]) and the "Château d'Otrante 
de Baudelaire" (72). Disturbingly, Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867) wrote no piece entitled 
"Château d'Otrante": the philosopher must be referring to Horace Walpole's gothic novel 
The Cast/e of Otranto (1764). His short discussion of the "réécriture esthétique du crime" 
therefore loses all credibility and should be disregarded given its distressful incoherence: 
/ 
not only is the exarnple ascribed to the wrong author, but it stems from the wrong century, 
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disrupting his literary history narrative? He then turns to detective novels, which "la 
lutte entre deux purs esprits - celui de meurtrier, celui de détective" characterizes, first 
under Émile Gaboriau's (1832-1873) pen from which was born detective Lecocq (72). The 
emphasis shifts from the crime to the investigation, a transposition the comparatist 
Theodore Ziolkowski has also described. 
Zio1kowski, in a chapter entitled "A Portrait of the Artist as a Criminal," elaborates 
a history of criminal narratives in which three concurring representations of the criminal 
emerge one after the other (chronologically) to then coexist in twentieth-century literature. 
He argues that the criminal can operate 1) as a titanic object whose mind is studied, 2) as a 
specific metaphor for the artist's immorality, and 3) as a genera1 symbo1 for the entire 
society's guilt. These figures however orny play out "on a literary level" (295). Before 
introducing this typology, Zio1kowski briefly presents the path crimina1 narratives followed 
within popular culture. He de scribes how British cri minaI biographies and their 
descendants, the Newgate nove1s, presented the titanic crimina1 hero and his deeds 
favourab1y. Sympathy then shifted from the crimina1 to the detective around 1830, as 
authors gradually displaced the Titan-like character from one to the other. 
Sorne fictiona1 crimina1s still retained a titanic quality afterwards. To explain why, 
Ziolkowski inserts this tentative assertion: 
It is perhaps not going too far to suggest that the titanism of evil, continued 
in the Volksbücher, the shilling pamphlets, and the penny dreadfuls of the 
nineteenth century, was deflected into the genre of horror fiction, which 
manifested itself on a literary level in Frankenstein, Dracula, or Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde. (294) 
This sentence prompts three remarks. First, Foucault's account of a class displacement in 
criminal fiction - which l have demonstrated to be quite flawed with his own French 
examples - is additionally incorrect when applied to British and German literature. The 
philosopher cites Jonathan Wild (1683-1725), Jack Sheppard (1702-1724), and Claude 
2 His description of the "découverte de la beauté et de la grandeur du crime" brings to mind IEstheticism 
and Decadence, which emerged after the detective novel (72). 
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Duval or Du Vall (1643-1670)3 as criminals famous in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries for their biographies and fictionalizations, like France's Cartouche (1693-
1721), Louis Mandrin (1725-1755), and Philippe Guilleri (?-1608). However, Victorian 
penny dreadfuls, akin in form to Sue and Ponson du Terrail's romans-feuilletons, revived 
highwaymen like Dick Turpin (1705-1739) and introduced Sweeney Todd, the demon 
barber of Fleet Street, keeping alive both titanic and popular criminals' celebration. 
Second remark, Ziolkowski's three samples of "literary [ ... ] horror" all hail from 
Great Britain. They contrast with nineteenth-century continental Europe Romantic 
narratives of criminality. To return to previously cited works, Hugo and Dostoyevsky 
narrate Jean Valjean and Raskolnikoff's psychological evolution, linking their infractions to 
social injustice. These authors vividly represent criminals, even murderers, as human. 
1 
During the same century, both before and after, British writers have offered Gothic 
renderings of criminality, situating it outside or on the borderland ofhumanity. 
Last remark, Ziolkowski ousts without any solid justification the three British 
classics from his cri minai narratives literary history to coop them up in "the genre of horror 
fiction." Granted, the last two do not fit his typology: Stevenson and Stoker's works 
showcase no criminal born good but corrupted by society, perhaps because in both novels 
the evil character is not given a narrative voice. However, 1 would like °to challenge his 
classification and rescue Mary Shelley's creation from the limited categorization of horror 
fiction by offering a broader study of the unnamed demon. The scientist may engender a 
being he firmly believes to be evil at the core, but it argues it is led to crime because society 
rejects it on physiognomic grounds for its inhuman nature. Three editions of Frankenstein 
were published during her lifetime. The first appeared anonymously in 1818. The second, 
signed, was released in 1823 to bene fit from the success of Richard Brinsley Peake's stage 
adaption, Presumption; or The Fate of Frankenstein, which opened the same year. Shelley 
revised the novel for a third publication in 1831. Her rewritings intensif y criminological 
implicationso 
3 Duval was certainly not as notorious as the preceding two, but his French origin might explain why 
Foucault chose to include him as an example. 
Physiogno~y and the criminal as Other also shape Stevenson's novella. In 
addition, a few contemporary reviews, such as those in The Dial, the Overland Monthly, 
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and Harper S Magazine, mention that it is reminiscent of Frankenstein (Payne 301; "Recent 
fiction" 323; "Editor's Study" 972). A single edition was published in 1886. Two 
fragmentary preparatory drafts on loose notebook sheets and an also fragmentary final 
manuscript still exist, but yield no criminologically-interesting revisions. In this Victorian 
text, the maker and his criminal creation share the same body, complicating the delicate 
operation of allocating responsibility. However, in his autobiographical narrative, Dr. Jekyll 
will, gradually, discursively convert Mr. Hyde into an inhuman Other. Upon first seeing 
him, the lawyer Gabriel Utterson, driven by a physiognomic interest in reading his face, 
similarly classifies the criminal. 
Other-ing and physiognomy are also pro minent themes in Oscar Wilde's "The 
Picture of Dorian Gray." Many contemporary reviews compared it - favourably (The 
Christian Leader, Light), unfavourably (The Christian World, The Speaker) or both ("A 
Revulsion from Realism" in Lippincott S Monthly Magazine) - to Strange Case (Mas on 
138; 145, 156; 140; 142; 166). Furthermore, Julian Hawthorne, in "The Romance of the 
Impossible," also published in Lippincotts, situates Wilde's work within a genealogy 
including both Frankenstein and Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, along with Honoré de Balzac's 
Peau de chagrin (Mas on 176-178). "The Picture of Dorian Gray" was first published in 
Lippincotts on June 20, 1890. The author revised and augmented the text for a book 
publication: the 1891 single-volume edition numbers 20 chapters, seven more than in the 
periodical. Wilde has made interesting additions for a criminological reading. An analysis 
of Wilde's Gothic piece in conjunction with Shelley and Stevenson's novels should enrich 
criminal narrative literary history. 
*** 
According to Ziolkowski's typology of criminal narratives, the second class of 
criminal representations to appear in Europe move away from an 0 bj ectifying gaze and 
treat the criminal as a metaphor for the artist. The following analogy between crime and art 
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could fit Dorian Gray into this category: "Crime belongs exclusively to the lower 
orders. [ ... ] l should fancy that crime was to them what art is to us, simply a method of 
procuring extraordinary sensations" (III 214). However, the critic concentrates on three 
early twentieth-century novelists: André Gide (1869-1951), Thomas Mann (1875-1955), 
and Hermann Hesse (1877-1962). These "immoralists" employed the criminal as a 
metaphor for the artist's guilt, marginal position, and attitude opposed to society. 
Ziolkowski contends that Goethe, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche inspired all three. The 
critic does specify that his list is not exhaustive (Ziolkowski 317). Could Wilde be an 
additional influence? He knew André Gide personally, even met with him daily for almost a 
month in Paris in 1891, and - Lord Henry-like - taught him that "nothing is good in 
moderation" (Fryer 32; Ellmann 253). There were no such encounters with Hesse and 
Mann: though Wilde was competent in German, he was undeniably more of a 
francophile (Ellmann 26). Mann sacrilegiously compares Nietzsche - a "Heiliger des 
Immoralismus" - to Wilde - a "Dandy" - in a 1948 essay: "aIs Revoltierende, und zwar im 
Namen der Schonheit Revoltierende gehoren sie zusammen" (Nietzsches Philosophie lm 
Lichte Unserer Erfahrung 46).4 Hesse seems to have taken no notice of Wilde. The latter 
has nevertheless influenced Gide strongly and Mann tangentially. 
Although he fits in the lineage, Wilde is not a precursor, like Goethe, Dostoevsky, 
and Nietzsche: he is rather the first ofthese immoralists. However, to correctly insert Wilde 
into Ziolkowski's typology, l would have needed to analyse Gide, Hesse, and Mann's 
novels, which were written after the lrishman's death. l am personally more interested in 
assessing how a literary work responds to its predecessors as well as to contemporary 
theories circulated in social discourse. Furthermore, Ideal with the criminal's objective 
status and subjective justifications, not with his metaphorical qualities. Hence, though l do 
believe a very good case could be made for Wilde's introduction into Ziolkowski's 
immoralist grouping, l have refrained from making such a demonstration since it is quite 
beside my main argument. 
4 The English translation reads "saint of irnmoralism," "dandy," and "they belong together as rebels, rebels 
in the name of beauty" ("Nietzsche 's Philosophy in the Light of Recent History" 158, 172). 
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*** 
This the sis brings together three classics of British nineteenth-century lite rature -
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and 
Mr Hyde, and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray - to offer. a new reading of the 
criminal elements at the heart of each text. My objective is to identify the conception of 
criminality the different characters' voice. Narrative structure must then be interrogated to 
determine which is preponderant. Attention shall be directed to two specific credences: the 
criminal as Other, known in penology and criminology as the notion of homo criminalis, 
and the ugly as evil, pseudo-scientifically studied as physiognomy. The following questions 
, 
shall guide my analysis: (1) how do es physiognomy intervene in the understanding of the 
criminal? (2) how is the criminal Other than human? (3) why do es this character kill? 
Possible origins for each retiology shall be retraced in earlier texts. 
Chapter 1, entitled 'A Portrait of the Monster as Criminal, or the Criminal as 
Outcast: Opposing }Etiologies of Crime in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein,' discusses the 
opposition between Dr. Victor Frankenstein's physiognomic prejudice and his creature's 
discourse designating social .exclusion as the cause of its mischief. Frankenstein's 
accusations rely mostly on its creation's appearance, borrowing from Johann Kaspar 
Lavater's (1741-1801) principles. The monstrous creature counter-balances its maker's 
presumptions by interpreting its own criminal behaviour similarly to Christian Wolf's self-
analysis in Schiller's short story "Der Verbrecher aus Verlorene Ehre." The novel 
additionally borrows from criminal biography tropes. 
Chapter 2, entitled 'Too Close and Cruel for Comfort: From "This, too, was myself' 
to "another than myself' in R. L. Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde,' 
offers an in-depth analysis of Jekyll's evolving understanding of Edward Hyde's nature. It 
also addresses Utterson's physiognomic speculations and their scientific and theological 
roots. References to the biological concept of atavism and the psychopathological 
categories of moral insanity and dual personality disclose interactions with contemporary 
social discourse. Stevenson questions human nature by illustrating the tragic 
consequences of pruning the soul's natural duality. 
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Finally, Chapter 3, entitled '''Poisonous influences" and "the real Dorian Gray": 
Criminal Responsibility in Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray,' revisits the epitome 
of physiognomy and the desperate need to construct the criminal as Other than one's self. 
Wilde gives a supematural indicator of evil in the form ofhis protagonist's portrait, literally 
depicting immorality, and its criminal corollaries, as decrepitude. This last chapter, the 
longest, is organized in two parts: Lord Henry Wotton's general discourse on criminality, 
linked to that of Wilde in his criticism, and aIl three main characters' rationalizations of 
Dorian Gray's sinful and criminallifestyle. 
Wilde's prose· is filled with self-plagiarism. His longer critical essays, published 
between 1889 and 1891, are at times rewritings of his 1880s joumalistic reviews; Lord 
Henry's aphorisms tum up in the 1890s plays; and the unfortunate author's prison writing, 
commonly known as De Profundis, reshuffies many themes dealt with in his earlier prose. 
Henee, Wilde's criticism clarifies Lord Henry's similar class:"based two-fold criminological 
stance: poverty causes crime, which, like art for the higher classes, improves individualism 
in the lower classes. Furthermore, references to contemporary thinkers' texts - most notably 
those of sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) and anarchist Prince Pyotr 
Kropotkin (1842-1921) complete the analysis when Wilde's position remains unc1ear. 
Chapter 3 will then briefly recapitulate Basil Hallward and Lord Henry's opposing theories 
on Dorian: does he act under Lord Henry) influence or has the latter revealed the younger 
man's true self? The criminal's scapegoatism will thence be explored in detail. Influence -
ideological, genetic, even astrological - serves as an escape from responsibility. 
Chapter 1. A Portrait of the Monster as Criminal, or the 
Criminal as Outcast: Opposing !Etiologies of 
Crime in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein 
"Ali men had offended me, for ail were better 
and happier than me. [ . .} much was promised ta my 
hunger for revenge. " 
Friedrich Schiller, The Criminal Jrom Lost Honour 
The epigraph presents the vengeful sentiments ostracism brewed in Christian Wolf 
in words very similar to those Mary SheIley's monster utters: the creature interprets its own 
behaviour, identifying causes that counter-balance its maker's presumptions. Indeed, 
Frankenstein showcases two competing discourses on criminality, foreshadowing the 
nature vs. nurture debate that still endures today. Both perspectives adapt tropes that can be 
found in criminal biographies, though offering a different take on the relationship between 
human nature and criminality. Influence from Johann Kaspar Lavater on the one hand and 
from Friedrich Schiller on the other shapes these retiologies. 
*** 
Murder, in the Frankenstein family's opinion, is not a deed everyone is capable of 
committing. This consideration arises with Justine Moritz's accusation. Ernest, when 
welcoming home his eIder brother Victor and announcing the unfortunate news, exclaims 
his surprise and dismay at discovering that she had "suddenly become capable of so 
frightful, so appalling a crime" (206V If the young man considers the girl as a persan 
incapable of such a rash killing, other comments extend this inability to aIl human beings. 
Justine herselfpushes criminal capability outside.ofhuman reach and into the realm 
of the supernatural. In what might however simply be a figure of speech, she expresses her 
5 Quotes from Frankenstein are taken from the 1831 edition. In this case, the 1818 and 1823 editions read 
"aIl at once become so extremely wicked?" a wording less designed for a criminological interpretation. 
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relief at learning that Elizabeth does not believe her "a creature capable of a crime 
which none but the devil himse1f could have perpetrated" (62). The discourse ofhuman 
incapability to commit crime is also present in Victor's stance. He holds that "Justine, and 
indeed every human being, was guiltless of this murder," a conviction indeed brought on by 
his detection of another suspect (57). Nevertheless, neither confession nor irrefutable 
evidence enables him to incriminate the creature. Therefore, a strong belief in the 
incapacity of any human being to kill such a sweet child tints, and strengthens, his 
assurance. Capability is at the heart of the Frankenstein house's dis course on murder. 
Furthermore, Victor firmly considers criminality, or at least homicide, to emerge from a 
state ofinhumanity, to be the prerogative ofbeings other than human. 
This· contrasts sharply with the prevalent view in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century England, according to which univers al human depravity caused crime. Criminal 
biographies, for instance, emphasized common traits between murderers and the rest of the 
population. Pamphleteers reminded readers of their human condition - shared with 
criminals - which rendered each and every one capable of the worst atrocities (Faller 54). 
For instance, Gilbert Burnet records in his Last Confession, Prayers, and Meditations of 
Lieutenant John Stern, that the murderer, condemned in 1682, had previously "thought 
himself as little capable of committing such a crime, which should bring him to such an 
end, as any man was" (10). Furthermore, sampling early seventeenth-century personal 
memorabilia, Cynthia B. Herrup points out that "[ n ]one of the conventional assurances of 
social status, family harmony or good fortune did more than temporarily assuage anxiety 
about human frailty and vulnerability to temptation" (109). Indeed, compilations such as 
Lives Of The Most Remarkable Criminals, published in 1735, attested even gentlemen 
could succumb to vice and become pirates or murderers (LMRC 1 184, 202). No one was 
safe, for depravity lay in the core of every human being. 
Nevertheless, sorne individuals did break the law and others did not. What could 
explain this discrepancy? The contemporary retiology of crime revolved around criminals' 
greater indulgence in the universal "propensity to sin" (Faller 61). In the eighteenth century, 
the population understood that this leniency had, in time, "hardened them emotionally and 
morally" (61). By starting with seeming1y insignificant sins such as breaking Sabbath, 
people would embark upon a deviant train de vie that hardened their hearts, eventually 
weakening their will, and in the end compromising their mind or judgement (99): 
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in the present Age, the Depravity of Men's MoraIs being greater than ever, 
they addict themselves so entirely to their Lust and sensual Pleasures, that 
having no Relish left for more innocent Entertainments, they think no Price 
too great to purchase those lewd Enjoyments, to which, by a continued 
Series of such Actions, they have habituated themselves beyond their own 
Power to retire (LMRe II 245-246) 
A much quoted passage from Ben Jonson's Eastward Ho (1605) humorously illustrates this 
'" domino theory' of human character": "Of sloth cometh pleasure, of pleasure cometh riot, 
of riot cornes whoring, of whoring cornes spending, of spending cornes want, of want 
cornes theft, of theft cornes hanging" (Herrup 109; IV, 2). Criminal biographies did not seek 
to expose such logically causal chain reactions, content with identifying in a murderer's 
past tell-tale si(g)ns. Ultimately, criminals were neither more nor less depraved than any 
other individual, but by giving way to sin, they opened their hearts, wills, and minds to 
illegal mis chief. 
The assumption at the heart of this retiology - universal human depravity - did not 
rule all minds. Philosophers of the Enlightenment, most notably Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
challenged such a pessimistic view of humanity in the eighteenth century. By refusing to 
blame any human for William's murder, Victor Frankenstein participates in this renewed 
optimism. Nevertheless, stating that humans are born good-natured does not resolve the 
interrogation about criminality. How do thinkers make sense of criminality in this new 
configuration? Explanations in which the elite could frnd comfort arise with the search for 
homo criminalis, a delimited group of individuals who indulge in crime and, in more 
radical theories, must be eradicated.6 The "criininal class" theory as well as criminological 
6 Michel Foucault states that, with the penal Code refonns of the end of the eighteenth century, the criminal 
became "un « monstre »," "« hors nature »" rather than "« hors-la-loi»" as under the Ancien Régime, but 
does not support his claim with evidence (92, 94). He only ex plains that the right to punish lay no longer 
in the sovereign' vengeance against his personal enemy, but in the defence of society, turning the criminal 
into a common enemy, a traitor to the entire community. The subsequent quantum leap to a "monstre 
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anthropology flourish during the nineteenth century. John Jacob Tobias traces the 
former concept's appearance back to the end of the 1810s (52). The assumption 
delineates a proper "caste" operating along the lines of its own "peculiar slang, mode of 
thinking, habits, and arts of living" (Wade 159). Cesare Lombroso best embodies the latter 
ltalian school. He wrote a treatise, L'Uorno delinquente (1876), recording precise 
characteristics regarding the criminal's physical appearance. Hence, after Frankenstein's 
first publication, scientifié retiologies emerged to explain criminality within the new 
optimistic paradigm ofhuman nature. 
l suggest that Mary Shelley's novel also opposes universal human depravity, not in 
scientific terms, but in a format arguably rooted in criminal biographies. She introduces a 
murderer treated as distinctly different from human beings, which is why l chose to treat it 
as neutral, though the text considers it masculine. Nevertheless, Frankenstein contains no 
single rationalization, contrarily to developing criminological theories. The fictional work 
provides not one but two discrete retiologies to replace the religious-Iaden attempt at 
explaining crime in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, two characters voice 
their own views on criminality: the creature and Frankenstein, the criminal and its creator. 
*** 
As the notion that rus creation would be William's murderer strikes Victor, he 
convinces himself of his intuition's truthfulness by asserting that no human being could 
have committed such a horrible deed. The thought flashes across his mind with the 
certainty of a revelation: 
Could he be (I shuddered at the conception) the murderer of my brother? No 
sooner did that idea cross my imagination, than l became convinced of its 
truth; [ ... ] Nothing in human shape could have destroyed the fair child. He 
was the murderer! l could not doubt it. The mere presence of th~ idea was an 
irresistible proof of the fact. (54-55) 
This passage, commented on by different critics we shall discuss, offers a crucial key to 
uncover the thought process that led Frankenstein to identify the creature as the criminal. 
« vomi» par la nature" requires justification (93). 
ln Victor's mind, certainty is eq:uated with truth. Jules Law explains that such an 
illumination is a Romantic trope. William Blake, in "Proverbs of HeU" (1790-1793), 
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de scribes it succinctly: "Every thing possible to be believ'd is an image of truth" (1. 38). 
Ideas move directly from the realm of thought to that of reality in the Romantic conception 
of creative imagination (Law 980). The process is nonetheless strengthened by an important 
bias. Commenting on the same passage, Scott J. Juengel clarifies: 
"On the one hand, Frankenstein projects wickedness onto the creature based 
on his disfigured 'shape'and deformed 'aspect,' a verdict that has 'an 
irresistible proof of the fact,' despite Frankenstein's limited knowledge of his 
creature's history and temperament; on the other hand, Frankenstein's 
intuitions prove prescient when the creature later confesses to the 
crime." (362) 
What was first only imagined is eventually verified and proves to be true. 1 agree with these 
statements, but believe more is at work then creative imagination alone. 1 would argue that 
it is prejudice's support that allows the initial suspicion to leap into reality. 
Preconceptions regarding appearances play an undeniable role in the perception of 
criminals. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the term's etymology to pre- "before" and 
iudicium "judgement, sentence," hence to judge beforehand, before having confronted the 
facts and the accused. A very explicit example can be found in Robert Boreman's 1655 
account of his first encounter with a fratricide: "1 expected to see the head of a Monster, (a 
Beare or a Tigre) set upon the shoulders of a man" (qtd. in Faller 97).7 The mind mostly 
constructs prejudice around exterior manifestations since they impress it first and enable it 
to produce a quick, and often arbitrary, judgement. 
Be Frankenstein's truth-Iaden belief provoked or simply encouraged by prejudice, a 
close reading reveals that the creature's form - instead of its essence for example - shapes, 
or confirms at the least, Victor's first apprehensions.8 To describe whom or that which-
7 See Robert Boreman, A Mirrour of Mercy and Judgement, or an exact and !rue Narrative of the Life and 
Death of Freeman Sonds. London: Thomas Dring,·1655. 7. 
8 Tt is unclear if the statement "Nothing in human shape could have destroyed the fair child" cornes as an 
afterthought or the rationale of a previous thought. The question lies in the concordance of chronological 
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could not "have destroyed the fair child," the tortured brother does not choose the 
words 'no human being' but rather "[n]othing in human shape." The creature's 
hideousness, as Other than a "human shape," precipitates its creator's prejudgement and 
accusation. What he deems a "deformity of its aspect more hideous than belongs to 
humanity" undoubtedly casts the creature for the part of murderer (54). Building on the 
believed truthfulness of its guilt, Victor even finds a motive to support his accusation: its 
"delight" must lie "in carnage and mi sery" (55). This reasoning will be subject to 
comparisonwith the accused's alleged motivation, and might thence be rejected. One of 
Victor's subsequent assumptions is clearly unfounded, for none can credit the creature with 
"rash ignorance" (206).9 Imagination does not create a transcendental reality; it forges one's 
own along the lines of one's prejudices. 
Though a crucial moment, this encounter is not the first instance of prejudice the 
maker contrives against his creation. Frankenstein presupposes meanings for his creation's 
actions from the very beginning of its existence. When the exhausted scientist awakens 
from his blissful nap after the fatal galvanism, the creature is hovering over him, "one hand 
was stretched out, seemingly to detain [him]" (40). Victor interprets the gesture violently, 
though nothing points to that particular reading, apart from his own prejudice concerning 
what he repeatedly identifies as a "monster." In its creator's eyes, this appellation sums up 
both the creature's exterior and interiOf qualities. 
Presenting "unearthly ugliness" as a stigma of a devilishly evil nature consists in an 
extreme form of physiognomic argument (73). In a chapter entitled "Von der Harmonie der 
moralischen und kôrperlichen Schônheit" of the first volume of his Physiognomische 
Fragmente zur Beforderung der Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe (1775),10 Lavater 
sets out to prove the existence of a consonance between moral and physical attributes using 
and narrative sequence. If Frankenstein's narration adequately renders his thought process, the sentence 
can be read as the emergence, within the scientist's consciousness, of the unconscious reason for which he 
accused his creation. Otherwise, if this explanation occurred before its inevitable conclusion, tbe narrator 
chose to delay its presentation to keep up the pace andrender fully the deadly revelation 's 
instantaneousness. 
9 This passage has been added in the third edition. 
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a reductio ad absurdum based on divine princip les. God, Who is perfect, would not 
allow discrepancy between moral and corporeal beauty. This perspective is epitomized, 
both conceptually and linguistically, in Frankenstein's warning to Walton: "His soul is as 
hellish as his form" (159). Physiognomy thus forges Victor's prejudice. 
Mary Shelley must have been acquainted with Lavater 's theories since her mother, 
Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), "made an abridgment of Lavater's Physiognomy" and 
mentioned him in her Letters written during a short residence in Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark (Godwin 65; Wollstonecraft 228). It might also be noted that Thomas 
Holcroft (1745-1809), her father's closest friend, translated the Essays on Physiognomy. 
Shelley was even subject, as a child, to a "precautionary 'reading,'" as Juengel terms it, 
though her father did not give total credence to the pseudo-science (355n). It can thus be 
reasonably assumed that she knew the Lavatarian principles. 
Physiognomy in Frankenstein becomes central as it dissolves the criminal's 
defence. The vision of a "filthy mass" which rekindles both "horror and hatred" constantly 
stiffens Frankenstein's compassionate feelings (110). On each encounter, Frankenstein 
reads wickedness in its "countenance": before hearing its autobiography on Montanvert, he 
speaks of its "bitter anguish, combined with disdain and malignity" while as they me et in 
Scotland he remarks upon its "utrnost extent of malice and treachery" (73, 129). 
Physiognomic principles no longer simply serve as a basis for prejudice, but Victor 
naturalizes them into an ideology on which he grounds his ruling. Indeed, the unproven 
assumptions endure, though contradicted by the Other's discourse once the dominant party 
allows for it to express itself. The scientist even questions his creation's own subjectivity by 
claiming he has "endued [it] with the mockery of a soul still more monstrous" than its 
"monstrous Image" (221).11 Physiognomy dismisses all the criminal 's possibilities of 
asserting himself. 
10 "On the Harmony Between Moral and Corporeal Beauty" in Essays on Physiognomy, translated by 
Thomas Holcroft. 
Il This passage has been added in the third edition. 
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Another element distinguishes Victor's treatment of criminality from his 
creation's discourse: he focuses on the criminal acts. The first time he confronts the 
creature, he accuses it of multiple murders (74). Yet, he is disposed to hear its story, out of 
curiosity blended with compassion, hoping to learn whether his suspicions were founded or 
not. Once the creature has reached the conclusion of its tale, his maker concentrates again 
on the last events recounted, most notably William's assassination and the framing or' 
Justine as the culprit. The audience in the Genovese, courtroom echoes the constant concem 
with the act rather than the accused as Victor perceives it is fixed upon "the imagination of 
the enormity she [Justine] was supposed to have committed," suggesting the trait is shared 
by the entire society (58). Michel Foucault considers thejudgement of the criminal's person 
rather than his or her act - especially criminology's consequent construction of a 
"connaissance « positive» des délinquants et de leurs espèces" - to be one of the multiple 
dangerous drifts of the disciplinary society, which replaces the "infracteur" by the 
"délinquant" (258). 1ndeed, with Foucault, "savoir" is re1entlessly suspicious, for it 
undeniably rhymes with "pouvoir" (27). largue psychological readings of criminality can 
just as well redistribute blame onto the entire social body as they can essentialize. 
Ultimate1y, Frankenstein forges his interpretation of the criminal in relation to its actions 
and appearance, a rather simplistic approach denying it any psychological development 
and, consequently, his own responsibility conceming its evil tum. 
*** 
The creature also retraces the cause of its rejection to its appearance. As it tells its' 
maker: "1 had sagacity enough to discover that the unnatural hideousness of my pers on was 
the chief object of horror with those who had formerly beheld me," for "a fatal prejudice 
clouds their eyes" (99, 100). It thus forms the plan to enter society through "the good-will 
and mediation" of two beings it be1ieves will not demonstrate the same prejudice: a blind 
man and a child (99). The creature reasons that its physical aspect will be kept hidden from 
the former's conscience, countering all possible influence, while the later would not have 
yet integra~ed, due to his young age, the cultural physiognomic prejudice. 
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On the earliest occasion, the idea proves successful, since old De Lacey is 
willing to help what he understands to be "a human creature" (100). Still more 
generously, he promises not to reject him "even if [he] were really criminal; for that can 
only drive [him] to desperation, and not instigate [him] to virtue" (100-101). Unfortunately, 
the three younger cottagers retum, interrupt the conversation, and drive the visitor away. 
Yet, the plan seemed promising enough for the creature to eventually retum to the cottage, 
hoping, with more time, to effectively win the father's heart. Disappointed by Felix's desire 
to flee, it however bums the house down, committing its first crime. Its initial attempt to 
enter society by approaching an unprejudiced individual failed due to the intervention of 
one that was prejudiced. 
Afterwards, the creature concelves of a new arrangement upon seemg a child 
wandering in the woods. It expects that "this little creature [is] unprejudiced, and [has] 
lived too short a time to have imbibed a horror of deformity," and thus purports to "educate 
him as [its] companion and friend" (106). Solitude would then be a long past nightmare, 
and the creature could conceivably aspire to integrate society through its pupil's mediation. 
Regrettably, its calculations were inexact, for fairy tales inculcate the "horror of deformity" 
at a very early age, as demonstrates William's belief that he is confronted with "an 
ogre" (106). When the youngster invokes his father's name, the abandoned creation's 
resentment against its maker explodes into its second crime and first murder. 
Retrospectively, its two experiments to incorporate human society end in a frustration 
causing criminal acts. 
The creature's quest to ease its pain and loneliness continues, though it no longer 
expects to join in the human fellowship. It therefore tums to its creator, asking, as did Adam 
in Paradise Los!, to make another like itself but from the other sex (8.379-411). The 
unfortunate being claims it should then be content and leave the sight of human eyes 
forever. When the scientist destroys the creature's half-finished hopes of happiness, it 
responds once more in a burst of rage, culminating with Henry Clerval's murder, for which 
Victor himself is framed. 
24 
After this incident, the creature is "heart-broken and overcome" (168). Its 
feelings of revenge have died out, leaving only pity regarding Victor and abhorrence 
towards itself. Learning that "he, the author at once of [its] existence and ofits unspeakable 
torments," is planning his wedding nevertheless rekindles the creature's thirst for 
reprisaI (168). The injustice is too poignant: "he sought his own enjoyment," explains the 
indignant being, "in feelings and passions from the indulgence of which 1 was for ever 
barred" (168). Elizabeth's death in its hands evens the injury of seeing one's mate being 
destroyed. 
The circumstances of each of these four cnmes demonstrate how deeply the 
creature's criminality is interlocked with social rejection caused by its own external 
deformity. It feels the victim of extreme injustice - "ShaU each man [ ... ] find a wife for his 
bosom, and each beast have his mate, and 1 be alone?" - which it hopes to atone by 
securing the mediation of a human companion. But aU its efforts prove useless (130). 
Striving to prove itself worthy of living in a community even becomes counterproductive 
when it saves the drowning young girl and is thanked by being shot. Injured both physicaUy 
and emotionaUy by society, the desperate being engages in a vendetta against its maker, 
responsible', initiaUy, of having brought it into an inhospitable world, but chiefly, of having 
abandoned it. In its c10sing confession, it asks Walton: "Am 1 to be thought the only 
criminal, when aU human kind sinned against me?" (169). Frankenstein's focus lied on 
physical appearances and mischievous deeds, and he imagined the assassin to relish "in 
carnage and misery" (55). By bringiI?-g attention to the workings of its own criminal mind, 
the creature suggests a representation akin to the first type introduced by Ziolkowski: the 
criminal as Titan. 
*** 
Ziolkowski identifies a number of characteristics graduaUy appearing in literary 
texts, each offering a more precise image of the criminal. In the first sample work, Le 
Neveu de Rameau (1762), Denis Diderot depicts the criminal, a titanic figure, with an 
objective detachment focused on his mind. In the second, Der Verbrecher aus ver/orner 
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Ehre (1786), Schiller has added two crucial characteristics to the titanic criminal 's 
representation: 1) born good as all human beings, society corrupts him, yet 2) once 
driven to crime, he wilfully chooses his evil doings. These characteristics form the basis of 
a literary manifestation of the criminal that will culminate with Jean Genet in the mid-
twentieth century. 
Though subsequent works will follow in Schiller's footsteps, his conception of 
criminality will not stand altogether unchallenged. The first of two novelties he 
incorporated will undergo a transformation in the 1810s with Romantics such as Clemens 
Brentano (1778-1842) and E.T.A. Hoffmann (1776-1822). Under the influence of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and the Sturm und Drang, Schiller had placed responsibility for 
criminality on society, but Romantic Naturphilosophie shifts it to nature, giving the 
criminal representation a psychoanalytical twist avant la lettreY Frankenstein, however, 
does not seem to follow this path; the creature's claim that ostracism is responsible for its 
criminal career stands much closer to Der Verbrecher. It thus seems safe to assume ancestry 
must be looked for in Schiller's novella and not in Brentano's or Hoffmann's works, though 
temporally closer. 
Interestingly, that precise story has been examined as a possible literary source for 
Mary Shelley's novel. In an article pub li shed in 1915, Geoffrey Buyers called attention to 
similarities between the creature and Christian Wolf, Schiller's Verbrecher. His proof 
however lacked a determining element: how could Mary Shelley have been acquainted with 
the German story, if she could not read it in the original language? Syndy McMillen Conger 
dusts off the hypothesis in 1980 and further supports the argument by indicating three 
translations, since then uncovered, that were available in England before the penning down 
of Frankenstein. Indeed, Schiller's tale is embedded in Peter Teuthold's The 
Necromancer (1794), for the most part a translation of Karl Friedrich Kahlert's Der 
Geisterbanner (1792). It was also published on its own in two periodicals: as "The 
Criminal" in The German Museum (1800) and as "The Cri minaI from Lost Honour" in 
12 Ziolkowski concludes his discussion of the criminal as Titan by incorporating Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and 
Jean Genet. 
Universal Magazine (1809-1810). Mary Shelley could thus have had access to 
Schiller's short story in English and used it as an inspiration for the treatment of 
criminality in her work. 
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Conger posits three potential mediations through which the writer could have heard 
of the story: by Matthew Lewis (1775-1818), author of The Monk; by Percy Bysshe 
Shelley (1793-1822), her soon-to-become husband; and by William Godwin (1756-1836), 
her father. The former visited the Shelleys at Lake Leman in 1816 and told many tales, one 
of which Mary transcribed in her journal. Der Verbrecher aus verlorner Ehre might have 
been one of the others. Additionally, P.B. Shelley owned a copy of The Necromancer which 
she could have read. Finally, the latter consulted Teuthold's book in 1795, and could have 
been interested in periodicals such as The German Museum and Universal Magazine, 
rendering Schiller's story available for his daughter during her childhood. These are aIl 
plausible hypotheses concerning Mary Shelley's acquaintance with the German tale. 
To sustain his argument, Geoffrey Buyers dwells on semiotic similarities. Conger 
successfully demonstrates their frailty. She rather draws attention to three situational 
resemblances and to correspondence in both form and general thematic. Though the former 
are mildly convincing,13 the latter are much more promising. They shall be addressed in the 
course of the last two sections of this chapter along with the creature's will to crime. This 
last element is the remaining piece of evidence required to incorporate Frankenstein in 
Ziolkowski's theorization of the criminal as Titan. The previous section has amply 
demonstrated that within its discourse, the creature presents itself as a good soul 
condernned to rejection - thus corrupted - by both its 'father' and humanity in its entirety. 
13 The tirst concerns both criminaIs' ugliness. Indeed, Schiller's character was distigured by a horse kick in 
his youth. However, Christian's defonnity is not as central as the creature's physiognomy, because it is 
referred to only in the beginning of the story. The second draws a comparison between each criminaI's 
encounter with a child. Conger is right to assert that the two instances are "pivotaI episodes," though 
wrong, in Frankenstein, in affinning it "precipitates the causal chain of crimes" (226). Indeed, as it has 
been described previously, the creature's fust crime is pyromania called upon by the cottagers' desertion. 
The connection between Christian's appeal to commute a death sentence into a life in the military and the 
creature's request for a mate is simply too far fetched (McMillen Conger 228). 
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*** 
Pointing out a formaI similarity, Conger remarks on the fact that both Schiller's and 
Shelley's stories encompass "criminal autobiographies" presented as "speeches aimed at 
attaining forgiveness" (225). This form draws hs origins from seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century English cri minai biographies, collected in The Newgate Calendar: The 
Malefactors ' Bloody Register starting in the mid-eighteenth century. Adaptation of criminal 
biography tropes in Frankenstein episodes can be more convincingly argued than 
resemblances with Schiller's short story. 1 shall examine three such similarities. 
Justine's accusation includes two frequent scenes leading to condemnation III 
criminal biographies. First cornes a convenient disco very of evidence, such as finding in the 
young girl's pocket the picture William was wearing on the night of his death. In criminal 
biographies, such "admirable discoveries" (qtd. in Faller 74)14 would be accounted for as 
divine interventions. Nevertheless, FalIer points out that, gradually, as the population 
moved away from superstition, His workings seemed less miraculous, more invisible (75). 
Hence, God's absence in the Frankenstein episode does not contradict the possibility of it 
adapting a frequent criminal biography trope. 
The second such instance can be found in the state of confusion Justine enters 
immediately after being presented with the evidence: "On being charged with the fact, the 
poor girl confrrmed the suspicion in a great measure by her extreme confusion of 
manner" (57). In criminal biographies, this was also understood as a direct implication of 
the accused's guilt, but specifically sent down from Heaven. Faner puts it nicely: "God had 
no need to point a supematural finger [ ... ] at most murderers, so easily could He indict 
them by disordering their minds, spreading them over with confusion and fear" (76). Again, 
the possible connection is not diminished by the lack of divine reference in Frankenstein. 
Faller speculates further on the possible cultural programming to which this beHef could 
lead. Indeed, it might have increased the murderer's nervousness at being betrayed by that 
very nervousness (78). Justine indeed understands her confusion worked against her case 
14 See William Lupton.A Discourse OfMurther, Preach'd In The Chapel At Lincoln's-Inn. 1725. 17. 
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and strives during her trial to seem calmer (58). Though significant, the two 
resemblances - in the evidence's discovery and the accused's state of confusion - might 
gesture toward a common social discourse disseminating the belief that culprits are doomed 
to be caught. 
The most telling element adapted from criminal biographies is the final repentance 
the creature displays in its confession. Robert Walton dismisses it as "superfluous" once the 
dirty deeds are do ne (167). His opinion is quite contrary to the oneexpressed in criminal 
biographies, for which redemption through public confession was a crucial means of 
reintegrating the criminal in society - albeit before ejecting him or her for etemity (FalIer 
93). Foucault altematively reads these public confessions as a confirmation of the trial and 
the condemnation's worth: "La justice avait besoin que sa victime authentifie en quelque 
sorte le supplice qu'elle subissait" (69). Unsettlingly, chaplains were charged with wringing 
out confessions by invoking etemal damnation (Faller 88). Justine, for instance, is 
"besieged" by her confessor who "threatened excommunication and hell fire" (62). Public 
confession could thus be a very dubious proof of the condemned's culpability and of 
justice's righteousness. 
The creature's confession, unlike Justine's, is freely offered during its encounter 
with Walton. Bowed over its maker's remains, it "utter[s] wild and incoherent self-
reproaches," unreservedly adrnitting "That is also my victim!" and asking him to be 
pardoned (167). Its repentance is manifest and unrestrained, as confessors preferred. For 
instance, Bumet was satisfied by one of Lieutenant John Stem's accomplices' attitude: he 
"was free and ingenuous in ms confession and expressed great sorrow for what he had 
done" (9). By demonstrating that murderers could be redeemed, crirninal biographies 
argued that "conscience was active, at least potentially, in aIl men" (FalIer 89). It is also 
active in Frankenstein's criminal, continuously tortured by remorse. Its confession mirrors 
the exemplary behaviour sought in criminal biographies as weIl as their figures of speech. 
lndeed, the unfortunate being states that "crime15 has degraded [it] beneath the meanest 
animal" (227, 169). The use of this frequent bestial metaphor can be compared with John 
15 The 1818 and 1823 editions read"vice." 
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Stem's alleged reflection on "what a beast he had been" (10). Though different than 
Jilstine's, the creature's confession also seems to stem from criminal biographies. 
Retuming to Ziolkowski, the creature's final confession demonstrates the second 
element identified in Schiller's tale, namely, the will to crime. Though its "he~ was 
fashioned to be susceptible of love and sympathy," it had to adapt to "an element which [it] 
had willingly chosen" (167, 168, emphasis added). Consequently to Elizabeth's death, 
"[e]vil thenceforth became [its] good" (168). Responsibility thus does not uniquely lie on 
society's side, but also on the individual. Free will is asserted in both Schiller's and 
Shelley's tales. 
Conger perceives that "[ e ]ach tale dramatizes a monstrous metamorphosis: creatures 
with the potential for nobility are transformed by fellow humans into fiends" (228). In 
Frankenstein, however, this outlook is limited to the creature's discourse. Hence, Conger's 
statement.takes for granted that the creature's perspective ultimately cornes across the entire 
narrative, bypassing Victor's. This premise has yet to be demonstrated. Even after the 
creature's last words - its only speech free of its maker's commentary - both Walton and 
the reader are left wondering whether it was telling the truth. 
*** 
By framing Frankenstein's story in an epistolary novel, the narrative structure 
allows for the reader to evaluate on a personal basis each of the two 'criminological' 
theoriès' credibility. Indeed, the presence of Robert Walton as a mediator opens up a space 
to better assess the Swiss doctor's subjectivity and to take a critical stance regarding ms 
autobiography. The creature's eloquence induces suspicion in both men, but the same could 
be applied to Victor's own persuasiveness. 
Frankenstein's creature is highly eloquent, but its horrific physique leads his creator 
to believe it deceitful by exhibiting a Satan-like rhetorical capacity. Both Victor and Robert 
acknowledge the creature's eloquence. Indeed, though the former wamed the latter that his 
creation was both "eloquent and persuasive, and once [its] words had even power over [ms] 
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heart," the amateur geographer admits he "was at first touched by the expressions of 
[its] misery" (159, 168). Unfortunately, the being's elegant speech is in direct conflict 
with its physiognomy, thus its words are worthless when directed to one who can look upon 
him. 
As the novel draws to a close, the explorer's comments on his new found friend's 
eloquence offer an interesting parallel with the exact quality he warns the creature will 
exalt. "He spoke this with a voice .80 modulated to the different feelings expressed in his 
speech," writes Walton, "with an eye so full of loft y design and heroism, that can you 
wonder that these men were moved" (164). Is this ability to convey emotion to one's 
audience not as dangerous as the hideous being's "powers of eloquence and 
persuasion" (168)? 1 believe the Englishman suggests, involuntarily, the same caution 
should be applied with regard to Frankenstein's discourse. 
IJltimately, Frankenstein criticism is always bound to address the question of 
creation, so central that it is referred to in the subtitle: The modern Prometheus. 16 In the 
battle of subjectivities, the fact that Victor created the alleged monster actually tips the 
balance toward the latter's criminological views. Indeed, the scientist defends 
physiognomic considerations while the creature argues that same prejudice induced its 
solitude - which in tum gave rise to a criminal rage and despair. In truth, the scientist did 
create a hideous being. Hence, if Victor Frankenstein symbolizes the ideas for which he 
stands, the cri minaI was created by physiognomic prejudice, which surnmarizes the 
creature's own conception. Hence, though both positions are credible, the storyline seems 
to support the creature's view that the criminal might be a monster, but created by those it 
vengefully hurts. 
To conclude, 1 would like to expand upon another of Conger's statements. She 
argues that "[l]ike Schiller's tale, Mary Shelley's novel aims to create a revolution in 
attitudes, to encourage compassion and humility: compassion for our less fortunate fellows 
and humility conceming our own rather overrated superiority to them" (228). One may 
16 In Greek mythology. Prometheus is credited with the creation ofhumankind from clay. 
replace "less fortunate fellows" by 'criminals.' lndeed, provided one accepts the 
creature's version, the criminal is stripped of any congenital inferiority and acts as any 
human being would have. This is not unlike cri minai biographies. 
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Chapter 2. Too Close and Cruel for Comfort: From 
"This, too, was myselr' to "another than 
myselr' in R. L. Stevenson's Strange Case of 
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde 
"That every murderer is presumably a madman is a 
comfortable doctrine which men are naturally much 
inclined to accept. To admit that a horrible crime has 
been deliberately committed by a human being, is 
indirectly to reflect on ourselves, especially if the 
criminal, as a refined and educated pers on, represents 
hum an nature at its best. [ . .} we are easily persuaded 
to believe in the existence of insanity, which, by 
disallowing to the criminal the possession of a nature 
such as ours, relieves us from an inference unflattering 
to ourselves. " 
"Criminal Irresponsibility of the Insane," Law Magazine and Review, 1 April 1872 
The epigraph epitomizes the nineteenth-century (and onward) need to wring human 
nature of its criminal potential by classifying the crirninal as different and abnormal in any 
and every possible way. In Robert Louis Stevenson's classic double's tale Strange Case of 
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, the scientist regards his alter ego as "natural and human" until he 
commits a motiveless murder, after which he becomes a being in which "nothing human" 
exists (EUP 61, 70). Between these two extremes, in a rare moment during which he 
implies that he, rather than sorne Other, is the culprit, the doctor diagnoses himself with 
moral insanity, a psycho-medical category of mental illness. Two further conditions on 
humanity's frontier come into play when the lawyer Gabriel Utterson, a friend of his 
unaware that Hyde and he are the same person, suggests biological atavism and demonic 
intervention to account for the deformity which an note upon meeting the villain. He is 
appalled by the mysterious ties which bind to him the respectable Henry Jekyll. The latter's 
horror, and rhetoric dissociation, grows as he witnesses the extent of "pure evil"'s 
depravation (EUP 62). After embracing his natural duality, Jekyll is forced to recognize that 
a constitutive and natural pole - evil in his case - reveals itself unfathomably extreme 
when separated from its antagonist. 
*** 
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Edward Hyde's physical appearance is thought to supply fundamental cIues about 
his nature. The Victorian age kept well alive physiognomic beliefs with manuals 
popularizing the reading of these pseudo-scientific links between facial traits and 
psychological characteristics (e.g. Nelson Sizer's 1891 Heads and Faces, and Haw ta Study 
Them). Unfortunately, upon first speaking of Hyde to Utterson, who nevertheless knows 
him from Jekyll 's will, Richard Enfield is unable to translate his mental image into words: 
he can only de scribe the feeling of disgust which reviled him. The indescribableness of 
Hyde's face and body impedes its legibility. The search to de scribe and make sense of their 
deformity drives Stevenson's narrative, with each encounter either leading to new 
speculations or dismissing a hypothesis. 
The 1ack of representation fuels Utterson's near-obsessive des ire to set eyes on the 
dreadful being. Indeed, in free indirect speech, the narrator conveys the lawyer's frustrated 
c0!lcIusion as he reflects upon Enfield's strange "Story of the Door": "If he [Utterson] 
could but once set eyes on him [Hyde], he thought the mystery would lighten and perhaps 
roll altogether away [ ... ] He might see a reason" (EUP 16, emphasis added). According to 
the gentleman, reasons are not constructed, they are positivistically seen. He further embeds 
his representation in rationality by recasting his cousin 's description of a "not human-
damned Juggemaut" running over a little girl into a "human Juggemaut," as Marie-
Christine Leps perceptively remarks (211; EUP 15). While only a visceral subjective 
impression struck Enfield, Utterson hopes the sight of the dreaded face will yield to his 
positivist gaze an objective solution to the puzzle. 
While the objective answer remains evasive, the subjective response is uncannily 
universal. The des ire for physical description and the generated "spirit of enduring hatred" 
'combine and react in Utterson's mind to pro duce "a face worth seeing" (EUP 16). The 
repulsion it initiates is strong enough to affect the "unimpressionable Enfield" and grows 
increasingly intriguing as multiple other characters confirm its universality (EUP 16). 
Indeed, as he narrates the youngster's nocturnal trampling, Utterson's cousin recounts 
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his surprise at witnessing a doctor brought to the scene "tum sick and white with the desire 
to kill" Hyde (EUP 9). Relying on a stereotype related to his profession, Enfield deems him 
"as emotional as a bagpipe" (EUP 9). Thence, a weak and impressionable nature cannot 
justify this "usual cut and dry apothecary"'s reaction, as Victorians would easily explain 
and dismiss lower-class and female responses (EUP 9). In fact, the "odd subjective 
disturbance caused by [Hyde's] neighbourhood" must be physiological since it affects all 
alike (EUP 54). Furthermore, the sensation is translated into all levels of speech, from 
Poole's familiar "you felt it in your marrow kind of cold and thin" to Lanyon's medico-
technical terminology: a "resemblance to incipient rigor!7" and "a marked sinking of the 
pulse" (EUP 45, 54). A (negative) subjective impression universally characterizes Hyde 
though he evades objective description. 
This reaction, both deeply-rooted and epidermic, is by no means isolated In 
Stevenson's literature and in social discourse. It characterizes demonic encounters in 
"Thrawn Janet," a short-story written in Lallans, the Scottish Lowlands' dialect, and 
published in October 1881 in the Cornhill Magazine. Reverend Murdoch Soulis is twice 
taken by "a kind 0' cauldgrue in the marrow 0' his banes"!8: first when an unknown visitor 
arrives to see his sinister housekeeper, and then when he sees her new "fearsome 
face" (VaU. ed. Xl 164, 165). Like the aforementioned Satanic figures, criminals also stir 
uncanny subjective responses. As Zebulon R. Brockway, superintendent of the Elmira 
Reformatory in New York, explains at the 1890 International Penitentiary Congress, mental 
habits impress themselves upon the body and provoke the onlooker: "le tissu corporel se 
transforme en un type criminel jusqu'à ce que, même sans quelque laideur physique, la 
présence du criminel communique une impression de répulsion ou de danger" (Actes 564). 
The instinctual physiological aversion thus would serve as a warning against both immoral 
17 The fragmentary final manuscript added "or what is called goose-tlesh," a definition which was not part of 
the preceding notebook draft (EUP 197). 
18 "a kind of cold shiver in the marrow ofhis bones." 
influence ("impression de répulsion") and genuine threat (impression "de danger"). The 
expert's account converges with a fantastic literary trope. 
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Despite difficulties, Enfield attempts to satisfy Utterson's physiognomic curiosity. 
At first, he bends his efforts towards delineating Hyde's appearance by tracing it back to the 
impression with which he was left, tentatively asserting: "He must be deformed somewhere 
[ ... l, although 1 couldn't specify the point" (EUP 12). Then, declaring "1 can see him this 
moment," he scrutinizes the mental image his memory conjured, hopelessly grappling for 
isolated objective elements to share with Utterson (EUP 12). His efforts remain vain: he 
cannot pinpoint what is "wrong with, his appearance" (EUP 12).19 Hyde remains evasively 
who le; his traits, subjective. 
The (un)representation of Hyde's physical demi se within the novella spawned 
debates amongst critics. While Gordon Hirsch describes the "reluctance to emphasize 
[Hyde'sl physical appearance," Virginia Wright Wexman explicitly sets herself in 
opposition, stating that "Stevenson has gone out of his way to punctuate the narrative with 
sustained descriptions of his characters' physical characteristics" (283; 225). In view of 
these opposite perspectives, the question must be plainly asked: can the reader access or not 
the demonized protagonist's visual aspect? 
Eluding a straightforward positive or negative response, Bordat operates a most 
promising and accurate synthesis. He identifies both "quelques indications très générales 
(qui évoquent le caractère «simiesque» ou «troglodytique» du personnage), ou au 
contraire très particulières (qui focalisent sur un détail du corps [ ... ])" (119). These visual 
cues function cinematographically, which explains why they captured film scholar Wright 
Wexman's attention. The analysis compellingly clarifies Hyde's representation: between the 
zooming out of broad analogies and the zooming into particular physical details, facial 
traits are left out of focus. Stevenson writes in "A Note on Realism," which was first 
19 Indescribability is a common trope infin-de-siècle Gothie. Compare with Arthur Machen's The Great Gad 
Pan: "Every one who saw her at the police court said she was at once the most beautiful woman and the 
most repulsive they had ever set eyes on. 1 have spoken to a man who saw her, and 1 assure you he 
positively shuddered as he tried to de scribe the woman, but he couldn't tell why" (67). 
36 
published in the Magazine of Art in 1883, that "any fact that is registered [ ... ] is at once 
an omament in its place, and a pillar in the main design" (VaU. ed. IV 420). Details 
matter, though they are made to appear trivial. Naugrette describes Stevenson's technique 
as "[n]i flou impressionniste, ni exactitude photographique," but rather catered towards "la 
recherche d'une impression à produire et créée dans la clarté des lignes" (16) Paradoxically, 
the sum of neatly defined characteristics delineating Hyde's hand and body conveys but a 
vague impression of his face, the main site of psychological legibility according to 
physiognomy. 
*** 
Since Enfield failed to translate the dreaded face into words, Utterson is left 
wishing he could ·himself lay eyes on it. As Leps perceptively remarks, "[h ]is grasp of 
available information," which includes his cousin's story, but also Lanyon's account of his 
scientific dispute with Jekyll, "is always partial and his search for Hyde consists of a 
reinterpretation of already interpreted events rather than objective accumulation of 
facts" (210). Similarly, the reader is unable to construct his or her own conjecture on 
Hyde's deformity for lack of physical representation. Therefore, he or she must rely on 
other characters' surmises. Given that an omniscient narrator follows Utterson's point of 
view until the two closing chapters uncover the truth, the reader is bound to the stem man's 
projections until Lanyon and Jekyll's narratives lift the veil from the mystery. Immediately 
after his first encounter with Hyde, the lawyer formulates three hypotheses regarding the 
origin of his effect on the beholder: atavism, pure and irrational distaste, and Satanism. 
With the discovery of evolution cornes the fear of degeneration, an ambiguous term 
variably designating "disintegration of the highest levels of nervous organization, [ ... ] 
arrested development, [and] atavistic revers ion" (Reid 56). Utterson wonders if 
"[s]omething troglodytic" deforms Hyde's physique, bringing out caveman-like 
features (EUP 18)?O Stephen Arata and Donald Lawler have studied Dr Jekyll and 
20 In a political parody on Ireland by Punch, this hypothesis is turned into "Something like Frankenstein's 
Monster, shall we say, only intimately, inseparably related to its creator by a sort of clinging identity in 
dread duality?" ("Dr. McJekyll and Mr. O'Hyde" 81). 
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Mr Hyde in conjunction with Cesare Lombroso's atavistic bom-criminal, exposed in 
L'uomo delinquente (1876). However, Stiles dismisses the potential source, quoting 
Arata himself: "Lombroso's work tirst reached a wide audience in England thanks to 
Havelock Ellis's The Criminal (1891)," which Stevenson's piece predates (34). The 
objection stands on solid ground: 1 found no reference to the Italian criminal anthropologist 
in Stevenson's writing, whether fictional, non-fictional, or autobiographical. Nevertheless, 
atavism was a well-known hereditary law before Lombroso argued it applied to the 
criminal man. 
Evolutionary theory transformed atavism. Antoine Nicolas Duchesne (1747-1827) 
coined the scientific term, from the Latin atavus, 'ancestor,' in reference to the tendency for 
plant varieties to revert to the type, also known in English as "Reversion, or Throwing 
back," "Pas-en-arrière" in French, and "Rück-schlag (sic), or Rück-schritt (sic)" in 
German (Darwin 28). The concept was familiar: "Every one is aware that it is nothing 
unusual for a chi Id to resemble its grandfather or grandmother or sorne ancestor still farther 
back, more than it does either its own father or mother," states the 1861 manual The 
Principles of Breeding (Goodale 61). With the advent of Darwin's evolutionary the ory, 
atavism came not only to designate the reemergence of recessive genes after having 
skipped generations (the resemblance between grand-parent and grand-child to which 
Goodale refers), but also the appearance in an individual of traits from a more primitive 
stage within the species. 
The nineteenth-century progressive mindset specitically recoded antenor traits as 
inferior. Sorne anthropologists thus attempted the reverse: explaining inferior conditions, 
idiocy for instance, as a retum to an earlier evolutionary stage. In his 1867 monograph 
Mémoire sur les microcéphales ou hommes-singes, Carl Vogt suggested "microcephaly to 
be a case of atavism, the appearance of a type of brain inherited from· sorne very remote 
ancestral ape," a view which William Wotherspoon Ireland calls into question in his own 
On ldiocy and 1mbecility (1877), stressing their "human character" (Ireland 83, 87).21 A 
21 Ireland refuses to equate lesser development of an individual with a step back in evolution: "In the 
microcephalic brain we still see the human type with its folds and convolutions stopped in their growth, 
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head circumference notably smaller than average characterizes this cephalic disorder. 
The debate on "teratological conditions" continued well into the 1880s, e.g. with 
discussions on polydactyly - the presence of supernumerary tingers or toes ("Scientitic 
SeriaIs" 615).22 Were they "simple monstrosities" dr should they be considered as "a 
reappearance of a more primitive organisation, or a reversion (Rückschlag) to a primary 
state, - in a word, an atavism"? (Gegenbaur 615).23 Atavism equates ab normal conditions 
with degeneracy, itselfunderstood as an evolutionary throwback. 
Thence, the contemporary audience could read - and has read - Hyde, and 
Utterson's suggestion of a troglodytic being, in reference to pre-Lombrosian atavism. John 
Addington Symonds (1840-1893), poet and literary critic, writes in a letter to Stevenson, 
which Arata quotes in a footnote, that he has discussed his work "in wh (sic) atavism is 
played with" with "the great biologist" Sir Thomas Lauder Brunton (Maixner 211; qtd in 
192n5). The author can also be said to have had atavism in mind when shaping his villain. 
Nearly two years after Jekyll and Hyde (and still three years before Ellis's publication), 
Stevenson speaks of a character born of "a hideous trick of atavism" in "A Chapter on 
Dreams" (VaU. ed XII 249). The article tirst appeared in Scribner S in January 1888 before 
being reprinted in Across the Plains in 1892. Though the famous novella's genesis forms 
the piece's main object, the quotation refers to the terrifying mother in the short story 
"OlaIla" (1885). Hence Utterson's tir st hypothesis is most likely rooted in atavism. 
A reference to Tom Brown's quatrain on Dr. FeIl illustrates the second hypothesis, 
mere dislike. Itself a playful translation of a latin epigram by Martial - "Non amo te, 
Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; / Hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te" - the English 
satirist's rhyme runs as follows: 
now here and now there struck by an arrest of development which we cannot clearly explain, but which is 
not a copy of the brain of any monkey that ever existed or indeed could have existed" (89). 
22 The review summarizes a French article, L'atavisme chez l'homme, by Raphaël Blanchard, published in 
1885 in Revue d'anthropologie. 
23 The article is an abridged translation of Kritische Bemerkungen über Polydactylie ais Atavismus, 
published in 1880 in Morphologisches Jahrbuch. 
1 do not love thee, Dr FeIl, 
The reason why 1 cannot tell; 
But this 1 know, and know full weIl, 
1 do not love thee, Dr FeU (Lejeune 26). 
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Leps tentatively asserts that "the reader is left to assume that the story feU into discredit, or 
at least into silence, as it is never mentioned again" (213). No additional reference to 
Dr. FeIl may be made, yet Lanyon at first formulates the same "idiosyncratic, personal 
distaste" explanation based on the "principle of hatred" (EUP 54). He nevertheless 
abandons this causality for one lying "much deeper in the nature of man" (EUP 54). Both 
Utterson and Lanyon's reactions are too strong for them to admit a trifling personal enmity 
should move them to such depths. 
The third hypothesis is theological in substance and pervades an of Enfield and 
Utterson's discussions of Hyde. The former had explicitly referred to the latter as inhuman 
and demonic in his description of the violent attack upon the child: "It wasn't like a man; it 
was like sorne damned Juggemaut" (EUP 9). The scene was "hellish" and the culprit 
managed to maintain a "black sneering coolness" which is "really like Satan" (EUP 9, 10). 
Utterson, who had recast Enfield's "Juggemaut" as "human" in his dream, also binds the 
religious and the inhuman, as Leps remarks, once he himself has seen the man (212). The 
narrator conveys his confused effort to make sense of Hyde's appearance in direct speech: 
"God bless me, the man seems hardly human!" (EUP 18; 212). Perhaps the first clause is 
simply a formulaic inteIjection. However, Utterson may also be implying that he shall need 
God's blessing if he is faced with a being Other than human. As Katherine Bailey Linehan 
remarks, "the language of deviltry" both gentlemen employ may be simply "figurative," yet 
they still draw from "imagery of Satan and damnation in their attempts to account for the 
mystifyingly powerful sense of evil the stranger conveys" (93). In the end, religious 
vocabulary seems best suited to speak of Hyde. 
Utterson's final hypothesis suggests that Hyde could be "the mere radiance of a foui 
soul that thus transpires through, and transfigures, its clay continent" (EUP 18). The 
abnormal mark would signal, again, an inner defect, yet spiritual rather than genetic. 
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Settling his mind on this last explanation, the lawyer rhetorically apostrophizes his 
friend: "0 my poor old Harry Jekyll, if ever l read Satan's signature upon a face, it is on 
that of your new friend" (EUP 18). Utterson has been "read[ing]" Hyde's "face," as a 
physiognomist, as he had longed to ever since Enfield mentioned the name of Jekyll's sole 
heir. His analysis uncovers "Satan's signature": has Hyde entered a Faustian pact with the 
devil? Lineham very perceptively remarks that Utterson refers to "poor old Harry Jekyll," 
"Old Harry" designating the devil, as confirms John Stephen Farmer and William Ernest 
Henley's24 dictionary of slang (94; 97). Utterson's chosen interpretation clearly involves the 
archfiend. AU in all, the lawyer raises doubts about Hyde's humanity in two out of three 
hypotheses, including rus preferred explanation. 
Reading clues is key to any detective story,25 yet misreadings turn Stevenson's tale 
into what Arata calls "an uncannily self-conscious exploration of the relation between 
professional interpretation and the construction of criminal deviance" (33). Sexuality is 
distinctly absent, both explicitly and implicitly, from Utterson's three attempts at explaining 
Hyde's deformity and its effect. Nonetheless, readers may always create meaning while 
reading between the lines. Gerard Manley Hopkins, an English poet converted to Roman 
Catholicism, suggests in a letter to a friend in defence of Stevenson's work: "the trampling 
scene is perhaps a convention: he was thinking of something unsuitable for fiction" (243). 
Victorians are thus fully conscious of the author's self-censorship and let their own 
imagination fill in the blanks. 
Sorne of Stevenson's contemporaries, thus also from the pre-Freudian era, have 
interpreted lust as causing Hyde's violence. Frederick W. H. Myers' letters to Stevenson 
offer a most thorough account of such a reading. Deeply moved by Strange Case of 
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, the poet, essayist, and self-tal,lght psychological researcher wished 
"that it may take a place in our literature as permanent as 'Robinson Crusoe'" and 
24 Henley co-authored with Stevenson Deacon Brodie, to be discussed in the next section. 
25 For a reading of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde as a detective story, see Hirsch, Gordon. "Frankenstein, Detective 
Fiction, and Jekyll and Hyde." Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde After One Hundred Years. Ed. Gordon Hirsch and 
William Veeder. Chicago: U Of Chicago P, 1988. 223-46. 
consequently suggested numerous revisions to polish both story and style (Maixner 
213). Myers protested against Stevenson's "too vagu[e]" notion of "incarnate evif': 
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"Hyde is really not a generalized but a specialized fiend" (Maixner 215, emphasis original). 
The author acknowledges this objection as "just" in his written response (Letters V 216). 
However, he remains silent on the specialization his admirer proposes. 
Myers assumes that Hyde 's "cruelty developed from lusf' and consequently that he 
should "have simply brushed the baronet [Sir Danvers Carew] aside with a curse, and run 
on to sorne long-planned crime" (Maixner 214, emphasis original). However, he checks 
himself in a later comment: "1 don't understand the phrase 'kept awake by ambition.' 1 
thought the stimulus was a different one" (Maixner 217). In the passage to which he refers, 
Jekyll explains Hyde could have "come forth an angel instead of a fiend," but his "evil, 
kept awake by ambition, was alert and swift to seize the occasion" (EUP 62). Myers 
believes lust fuelled evil, whereas Jekyll's stimulus is bent towards proving sceptical 
colleagues wrong, a concem quite remote from "generous or pious aspirations" (EUP 62). 
Hence, the eager reader has himself identified a flaw within his sexually-oriented reading, 
but fails to resolve the apparent contradiction. 
Contrastingly, sexual connotations can be easily read into Utterson's guesswork 
pertaining to the nature of the ties binding Jekyll and Hyde. Indeed, their intimacy seems 
quite disturbing to the lawyer. After having fmally set eyes on Hyde and debated on his 
essence, he is left speculating on his relationship to the dignified Jekyll. The narrator 
refrains from quoting Utterson's thoughts on this second mystery. Left in the dark, the 
reader may freely interpret the lawyer's laconic assumptions with sexual depravity on his or 
her mind. Devising the relationship between two Victorian men is indeed a fruitful terrain 
for sexual innuendoes. Utterson discovers the men's particular bond frrst in the "strange 
clauses of [Jekyll's] will" (EUP 20). He learns from Enfield that Hyde has drawn a check 
from doctor 's account. The cousins both suspect blackmail. Who would attempt such a 
manoeuvre? 
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Utterson's first intuition casts Hyde as a "ghost of sorne old sin, the cancer of 
sorne concealed disgrace" (EUP 19). According to Arata, the lawyer "suspects that 
Hyde is the doctor's illegitirnate offspring" (40). He indeed speaks of hirn as Jekyll's 
"protégé," but also, more ambiguously, as his "favourite" (EUP 15, 26). The latter supposes 
sorne form of choice, with which biological filiation has little to do (OED). Further 
indication of Utterson's thoughts is given as Hyde's letter to Jekyll after the Carew rnurder 
relieves hirn of certain suspicions: "it put a better colour on the intirnacy than he had looked 
for; and he blamed hirnself for sorne of his past suspicions" (EUP 30). Hornosexuality is a 
form of intirnacy Utterson would most likely have felt ashamed of supposing on Jekyll's 
part. Hence, Hyde can easily be interpreted as his benefactor's illegitirnate child or lover. 
Stevenson's work is pregnant with certain sexual innuendos, though it refrains from 
definitely casting Hyde as the unfortunate and dreadful offspring of Jekyll's repressed 
sexual frustration. 
*** 
AIl encounters assert Hyde's abnormality, but the crirninal as Other trope takes up a 
new and fascinating dimension with Jekyll's perspective. Utterson's detective work cornes 
to an end with two closing staternents, which Stiles links to "the concrete data placed 
toward the end of the traditional nineteenth-century case study" (889). In the first, Lanyon 
reveals that Jekyll and Hyde are the exact same person, dissolving the sexual ties that could 
bind them. The second retells the entire narrative frorn Jekyll's perspective, starting in 
typical Victorian fashion with the moment of his birth. His dual personality problernatizes 
the identity of the criminal. 
Psychoanalytical cri tics focus their readings on the Freudian triptych structure of the 
psyche --.:. the id, the ego, and the superego, - overlooking the duality of rnind theme, a "late 
nineteenth century fascination," subject to both scientific debates and fictional 
representations (Harrington 106). Stevenson shared the obsession: the double lives of 
"esteerned citizen[ s]" troubled hirn deeply, and he returned "again and again" to the Deacon 
Brodie when discussing the topic (Simpson 115). Even his autobiographical self is divided 
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into opposite natures, enigmatically signing letters "Yours - (1 think) Hyde - (1 wish) 
Jekyll" to his mother and "Robert Louis Stevenson et Triple-Brute" to the sculptor 
Auguste Rodin (Letters V 247, 334). Both the well-regarded public man hiding an evil 
nocturnal alter ego and scÎentific advances in understanding the double brain infuse his 
Strange Case. 
Carpenter - cabinetmaker to be more precise - by trade, William Brodie (1741-
1788) had been elected deacon26 of the Wrights (Gibson 14). His day-time respectability 
was but a sham, for he performed night-time burglaries, breaking into households he had 
diligently studied while working at their service. He acquired legendary status in Edinburgh 
after he was hung. Cummie, short for Alison Cunningham, probably impressed the tale on 
young Stevenson's mind while nursing him; in his children's bedroom stood a bookcase 
and a chest of drawers wrought by the infamous hands (VaU. ed. VII 338). A precocious 
artist, Robert Lewis attempted twice during his teenage years to pen down a playon the 
haunting subject. The later manuscript found its way into the hands of rus friend W. E. 
Henley, who insisted upon reworking the draft (Borowitz 417). The final product, Deacon 
Brodie, or, The Double Lift, was staged with meagre success from 1880 to 1884 
successively in Glasgow, on tour in the States, and in London (Gibson 134). The drama's 
existential reflections set the scene for Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Brodie's soliloquy stands 
witness to the ever unresolved problematic of identitying the true self: "If we were as good 
as we seem, what would the world be? The city has its vizard on, and we at night we are 
our naked selves" (VaU. ed. VI 26).27 Persons leading double lives serve as a constant 
reminder that appearances are misguiding and duplicity, a human attribute. 
Fanny Osbourne Stevenson wrote in a preface to her husband's work that Deacon 
Brodie's story was coupled with impressions left by "a paper he read in a French scientific 
26 'Deacon' in Scotland designates "the president of an incorporated 'craft' or trade" (OED). 
27 A theatre critic reviewing an American staging of the play in 1887 remarks: "There is a touch ofweakness 
and vacillation about him [Deacon Brodie] which is not in harmony with the hardihood of habituai 
criminality. Compunctions of conscience are unknown to the professional outlaw, and when the deacon 
becomes sentimental he is unnatural and therefore uninteresting" ("Stevenson's "Deacon Brodie"" 244). 
Contemporaries thus sometimes read fiction against scientific discourse. 
journal on sub-consciousness" to form "the germ of the idea" of dual personality which 
infiltrates his play, a short-story entitled Markheim (1885) - in which a murderer claims 
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to be tom by evil and good "haling [him] both ways" - and his celebrated shilling 
shocker (Vail. ed. VII 338; Vail. ed. XI 152). Though Stevenson refused in an interview to 
link it with actual cases of double-personality, Richard Dury traces the French paper to 
Eugène Azam's Félida X case study (247-248). The weekly Revue scientifique published a 
series of five articles on that particular case and "double conscience" in general from 1876 
to 1879: the three first were printed front-page (Dury 243-245; Azam Iv-Ivi).28 Azam's frrst 
narrative was "skilfully condensed by Mr. H. J. Slack, in the pages of a quarterly journal of 
science," explains English journalist and astronomer Richard Proctor (89).29 He draws from 
this summary in an article entitled "Dual Consciousness" published in the Cornhill 
Magazine in 1877 and later collected in Hereditary Traits and Other Essays (1882) and 
Rough Ways Made Smooth: A Series of Familar Essays on Scientific Subjects (1888). Stiles 
suggests this publication as a more available source since Stevenson also contributed to the 
magazine at the time (880). Scientific accounts from French specialized publications, 
popularized and/or translated, may have merged with childhood memories to produce the 
Strange Case. 
In the following decade, scientific discussions on dual personality continued. 
During the 1880s, scientists such as G. Stanley Hall and E. M. Hartwell posited, like Jekyll, 
that "so far as the brain represents it, the soul must be double" in the philosophical 
quarterly Mind (102). Hence, duality is not a sign of insanity, but a 'normal' feature 
pertaining to healthy humans. 'Abnormality' is rather rooted in the imbalance between the 
left - rational - and right - emotional - hemispheres, which is thought to cause anything 
from multiple personality disorders to criminality (Stiles 886). Furthermore, Jekyll's 
contention that "others will outstrip" his dual-nature hypothesis was well-founded (EUP 
59). Six months before Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde was published, in July 1885, in France, 
Dr. Hippolyte Bourru revealed that his patient Louis Vivet had eight distinct 
28 Three of these were republications abridging longer papers which appeared in a specialized medical 
journal (Annales médico-psychologiques) or in colloquium proceedings. 
29 1 have not managed to retrace this article. 
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personalities (Hacking 172). Myers, who had suggested in writing alterations to the 
novella, wrote an article on the subject, "Multiplex Personality," published in 1886, 
shortly after Jekyll and Hyde came out in January, in which he also discusses Azam's 
famous patient Félida X. Additional testimony to the circulation of specialized theories 
within general social discourse: Myers's article first appeared in Proceedings of the Society 
for Psychical Research before being reprinted in the November issue of Nineteenth 
Century, a monthly review which also published sorne of Oscar Wilde's critical essays. 
Stevenson's shilling shocker, whether consciously or not, is perfectly in touch with 
contemporary scientific discoveries. 
French professor of English literature Jean-Pierre Naugrette bridges the gap 
between critics concentrating on nineteenth-century psychiatry and those using 
psychoanalysis. He situates Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde at the nexus of psychology's 
development: "aboutissement de toute une série d'histoires de cas, il [le conte de 
Stevenson] préfigure aussi les découvertes du fondateur de la psychanalyse" (32). 
Emerging from and pushing the boundaries of late-nineteenth-century case studies, the text 
exemplifies "de manière presque prophétique" the latter 's theories on the id, the ego, and 
the superego, though couched in evolutionary terms: Darwin, in pervading all analyses, is 
the Victorian Freud (32, 35). Hence, according to psychoanalytical critics, Stevenson 
transcendsfin-de-siècle Britain to appear as a precursor of Freud.30 
Adaptations have followed the trend, from theatre to film and ev en graphic novel. 
Dropping the title's first words - "Strange Case of' - they removed the epitextual reference 
to case studies.31 Interestingly, contemporary reviewers of the Saturday Review, Athenœum, 
and The Times emphasized the "strange case" through intertextuality: "It is certainly a very 
strange case," for example (Maixner 200, 202, 206). The widespread truncated title 
originates from Thomas Russell Sullivan's first dramatization, which opened in 1887 in 
30 Julia Reid rejects both the diffusion and the foreshadowing models of the relation between lite rature and 
science because they maintain them in separate spheres (6). 
31 None of the 36 entries of Richard Dury and Francis Bordat's filmography, which spans from 1908 to 1996 
and is appended to Naugrette's Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Hyde, wears Stevenson's full title. In addition, Lorenzo 
Mattotti and Jerry Kramsky's 2002 graphie novel is entitled Docteur Jekyll & Mister Hyde. 
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Boston. Stevenson complains of Hyde's stage representation as a "mere voluptuary" in 
a letter discussed at length further in this chapter (Letters VI 56). Just as adaptations 
have reinterpreted Stevenson's novella, Stiles contends that it adapts the case study genre, 
functioning as a Gothic parody and "lay[ing] bare the limitations of scientific prose" in its 
claim to objectivity (Stiles 881).32 Her demonstration, sadly, remains vague. Nonetheless, 
she has succeeded in framing Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde's indebtedness both in form and in 
content not only to science in the guise of (bio )chemistry, but also in that of psychology and 
psychiaU-Y. Scientific talk on the double brain complemented Stevenson's long-standing 
interest in double lives. 
*** 
The physical separation of Jekyll's dual personality into two distinct embodiments 
facilitates his distancing from Hyde. Yet, at first, the former expresses no desire to mark the 
latter down as different. Indeed, his perception of Hyde's nature evolves throughout his 
"Full Statement of the Case": he is, at first, human and part of Jekyll. Indeed, the doctor 
eagerly greets his alter ego's "form and countenance," though hideous, for they are "none 
the less natural," expressing elements of his own soul usually coupled with more virtuous 
components (EUP 60). His position is explicit in what Leps terms his "leap of welcome": 
"This, too, was myself' (207; EUP 61). Though Hyde be "pure evil," he is no less "natural 
and human" and consequently belongs to "the ranks ofmankind" (EUP 62,61,62). When 
he first 'meets' Hyde, Jekyll greets the evil constituent of his nature with serenity rather 
than shame or repulsion. 
Jekyll discovers the extant of Hyde's malice through 'perusaI.' While he only 
wished to indulge in the same "undignified" pleasures which he always sought, his 
nefarious 'twin' sets them on a "monstrous" trail: "This familiar that 1 called out of my own 
soul, and sent forth alone to do his good pleasure, was a being inherently malign and 
villainous" (EUP 63). A "familiar" can be both "an intimate friend or associate" and "a 
32 According to Foucault, the "examen disciplinaire" "fait de chaque individu un «cas»," thence both a 
"objet pour une connaissance" and a "prise pour un pouvoir" (I93). 
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de mon or evil spirit supposed to attend at a call" (OED). In "A Chapter on Dreams," 
Stevenson uses "Familiar" in its second meaning, as a synonym for "Brownie," a 
"benevolent spirit or goblin," supposed in Scotland "to perform useful household work 
while the family were asleep" (VaU. ed. XII 246; OED). Stevenson's Brownies supply him 
in his dreams with creative fabric in which he needs only to weave a moral before tailoring 
it into a written narrative.33 Jekyll has left his "familiar" "alone" and cannot interfere with 
"his good pleasure," son bon plaisir, both the legal expression (Jekyll is not only a 
physician, but also a lawyer) and, more obviously, any form of sensual gratification (EUP 
106n63, 13). While Hyde enjoyed deviant delicacies, the respectable though compound self 
"did not even exist," he contends, affording him total security from suspicion (EUP 63). 
The plan would have been perfect had it not been for the foil's exceeding deviance. 
In his quest for pleasure, Hyde is not only selfish but, a more worrisome trait, he is 
also sadistic. According to the mostly upright self, "his every act and thought centred on 
self; drinking pleasure with bestial avidity from any degree of torture to another" (EUP 63). 
To soothe his conscience and secure himself from remorse, Jekyll rejects responsibility for 
his alter ego's acts, which he strictly "connived," rather than "committed," ifwe follow his 
own terminology (EUP 64). Nevertheless, though Hyde gradually reveals himself to be 
worse than expected, he remains a "second self," a "part of [Jekyll]" (EUP 65). The latter's 
unease with regards to his "familiar" emerges as rus vices seem to outstrip those of the 
compound self. 
Jekyll diagnoses himselfwith moral insanity after the murder of Sir Danvers Carew: 
"no man morally sane could have been guilty of that crime upon so pitiful a 
provocation" (EUP 67). The phrase is uttered as an excuse, requesting apologetically not to 
be held accountable, as if he were "a sick child" who had broken "a plaything" (EUP 67). 
Moral insanity refers to a condition in which a pers on loses his or her sense of morality 
while his or her intellect still functions normally. James Cowler Prichard introduced the 
33 Arata remarks that "like the Brownies, [Hyde] is so easily identified with the raging energies of the 
id" (48). 
pathopsychological category in the 1830s, and it remained well al ive half a century 
after. 34 In a series of "Lectures on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity" published in 
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the London Medical Gazette in 1850, Dr. Robert Jamieson, of King's College, Aberdeen, 
differentiates intellectual and moral insanity. The former concems a "diseased perception" 
which produces "delusion" as a symptom while in the latter, disorder is found in "emotion," 
which leads to "loss of control over actions" (179). The distinction between "intellectual" 
and "moral" aspects of the mind recalls Jekyll's two "sides of [his] intelligence," both of 
which participated in his scientific endeavour (EUP 59). The doctor's description of 
psychological structures is in key with contemporary specialized discourse, making his 
denial at being a "man morally sane" a very probable moral insanity diagnosis. 
Jekyll does not deny that he was the one who "struck" (EUP 67). Hence, the "man" 
who is not "morally sane" can be no 6ther than himself. He is thus both practitioner and 
patient, "hopelessly confus [ing] the boundaries between objective observation and 
subjective experience" (Stiles 891). Medical discourse objected to collapsing the se roles: 
the psychiatrist was not supposed to recognize the 'diseased' aspects of the 
patient in himself. A psychiatric diagnosis was in the nineteenth century 
something that a doctor gave to the patient as an 'other.' Not until the advent 
of psychoanalysis would subjectivity be valorized as an appropriate 
instrument of medical-scientific investigation (Goldstein 138) 
Hence, Jekyll would be, not surprisingly given his unorthodox views on medicine, going à 
contre-courant, first identifying with his animalistic aspects and finally rejecting them as 
totally Other, diagnosing himself as morally insane in the process. 
After Sir Danvers Carew's murder, Jekyll revokes Hyde's claim to humanity. The 
latter is neither an atavism nor one who has entered a Faustian pact with the devil: he is 
himself a "child of Hell" and consequently "nothing human" inhabits within him, only "fear 
and hatred" (EUP 70). The doctor does not simply cast him off as inhuman, but also as 
Other: "He, I say - I cannot say, l'' (EUP 70). As he closes his "Statement," Jekyll clearly 
34 Witness the impressive list of over thirty references in English, German, Italian, and French given in a 
footnote in the French translation of Cesare Lombroso's seminal treatise (542-543). 
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rejects Hyde as part of his identity and refers to him as "another than myself' whose 
destiny he no longer shares (EUP 73). The protagonist's stance evolved from one 
extreme - self-same and human - to its total opposite - inhuman Other - with the mounting 
of the evil self's violence. 
*** 
Even before the experiment, Jekyll perceived his self as dual rather than unitary. 
According to Leps, he thus "shares the hegemonic view of human nature as an entity which 
can be divided into fixed realities" (208). Indeed, the doctor traces the origin of his 
downfall to a basic opposition within his character between "a certain impatient gaiety of 
disposition" and an "imperious desire to carry [his] head high" (EUP 58). Hence, though 
the former "has made the happiness of many," reconciliation with the latter was arduous, 
for it commanded "a more than commonly grave countenance before the public" (EUP 58). 
Therefore, he clearly states that, on its own, the "impatient gaiety of disposition" was not 
problematic, and others endowed with the same quality were happily rewarded. The 
problem stems from itsconflict with his "imperious desire" to present himself before his 
peers in a radically different posture, the "more than commonly grave countenance." 
Consequently, striving to satisfy "the exacting nature of [his] aspirations," he felt more 
sharply than other human beings the divide between "those provinces of good and 
ill" (EUP 58). Jekyll places fault not on evil impulses, but on his own intolerance to any 
deviation. 
The well-respected doctor wishes his virtuous self and his more decadent 
counterpart would each be free to lead an existence in accord with their own inclinations. 
1 
Thereon, he seeks to dissociate his conscience from the "undignified" pleasures in which he 
indulges, a scientific endeavour "socialement et moralement injustifiable," reminds 
Bordat (EUP 62-63; 121). Moreover, the doctor admits that had he "approached [his] 
discovery in a more noble spirit," Hyde rnight have been "an angel instead of a 
fiend" (EUP 62). Leps underscores how Jekyll's research orientation and motivation 
differentiate themselves from that of positivist scientism: it is "transcendental" - like 
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Frankenstein's35 - rather than materialist and its selfish goal is far from criminal 
anthropology's aim to "understand 'criminal man' and discover means to eradicate his 
presence from society" (EUP 56; 207). Jekyll wants to secure his own impunity while 
committing crimes: Hyde offers such protection. 
Stevenson accuses his character of hypocrisy in a letter to the American joumalist 
John Paul Bocock (1856-1903) written in November 1887: "The harm was in JekylI, 
because he was a hypocrite - not because he was fond of women" (Letters VI 56). The 
Scottish writer is reacting to his work's first adaptation, Sullivan's play. In contrast with the 
author's perspective, the fictional scientist dispels accusations of hypocrisy by legitimizing 
both good and evil in his autobiographical account. Each moral side functions differently, 
but both "were in dead earnest" (EUP 58). Pained by the "trench" in "the agonised36 womb 
of [his] consciousness," Jekyll aims to house them in "separate identities" (EUP 58, 59). 
Each element should be satisfied, freed from its "polar twi[n]," for each finds pleasure in 
opposite acts (EUP 59). Indeed, Jekyll opposes them as simply "just" and "unjust" (EUP 
59). Should each follow its separate course, the former would no longer be "exposed to 
disgrace and penitence," and inversely the latter would be "delivered from the aspirations 
and remorse of his more upright37 twin" (EUP 59). Nevertheless, Jekyll cannot leave his 
opposing personalities on a par and is forced to pass judgement. He admits that evil is "the 
lethal si de of man" given its decaying imprint upon the body (EUP 61). Who holds highest 
authority in assessing a character's sincerity? The character itself, the author, or the reader? 
Whether Jekyll be a hypocrite or not, the character, the author, and this reader agree 
that Hyde is simply evil. Stevenson objects ferociously to interpreting him as "a mere 
voluptuary" (Letters VI 56). His malice is worse than mere sexual deviance. The Scotsman 
swears heavily that "[t]here is no harm in a voluptuary" nor "in what prurient fools calI 
'immorality'" (Letters VI 56). He blames the reductive understanding on "people [being] so 
35 The connection would have escaped me had it not been for Richard Dury's editorial notes in the Centenary 
Edition (EUP). 
36 Stevenson replaced "sensitive" by "agonised" on the second notebook draft (EUP 142). 
37 The second notebook draft reads "perfect" (EUP 142). 
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filled full of folly and inverted lust> that they can think of nothing but 
sexuality» (Letters VI 56). Stephen Heath, author of the seminal essay "Psychopathia 
sexualis: Stevenson's Strange Case/' is unsurprisingly unconvinced: "if people are so filled 
full of folly and inverted lust> this must be central for what Hyde represents, aIl those 
'lower elements'" (94, emphasis original; quoting EUP 60). Yet, to the novelist, the "beast 
Hyde" remains "no more sensual than another" (Letters VI 56). Sexual-oriented readings of 
his villain infuriated the Scotsman. 
Stevenson makes c1ear in the fmai portion of his answer, which Heath leaves out of 
his own essay, that sexually-driven interpretations function as diversions. Indeed, the most 
dangerous "lower elements" still hold sway while moral lessons revolve around sexuality. 
Stevenson incisively dismisses these as irrelevant: "bad and good [ ... ] has no more 
connection with what is called dissipation than it has with flying kites" (Letters VI 56-57). 
What he deems central is rather "the essence of cruelty and malice, and selfishness and 
cowardice" (Letters VI 56). He stresses that "the se are the diabolic in man not this po or 
wish to have a woman, that they make such a cry about" (Letters VI 56). Hyde is evil, 
which pushes him towards sexual deviance> not the reverse. 
The imbroglio lies in misconstruing a consequence for a cause. Stevenson explains 
indeed that "the sexual field and the business field are perhaps the two best fitted for the 
display of cruelty and cowardice and selfishness," hence the confusion (Letters VI 57). In 
the end, Hyde is "a soul boiling with causeless hatreds," driven by "complete moral 
insensibility and insensate readiness to evœ' (EUP 72> emphasis added; 67). There is no 
other Ur-cause: pure evil is at the root of all of Hyde's actions, at least according to Jekyll's 
understanding. It can obviously be argued that Jekyll does not fully comprehend the 
situation. Leps conc1udes that since Jekyll is "unpl,"epared for Hyde's development," his 
"dispersion of a complex process" into "c1ear-cut, fixed entities" must be proven to be 
"ineffective> harmful, and untrue" (214). She contends that humans are "an incongruous 
amalgamation of possibilities" and cannot be separated into "good and evil" (214). 1 fail to 
see how the narrative disproves the assumption. 1 read Jekyll's miscalculations through the 
lenses of a single neglect: he has overlooked the fact that his evil nature, free from his 
good nature's remorse, can only be more extreme. 
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Stevenson's epigraph supports a reading of Hyde's excessive violence as the result 
of pure evil released from its tempering combination with equaIly pure good. The warning 
is explicit: "I1's ill to loose the bands. that God decreed to bind" (EUP 4). The author 
inscribed moral judgement within a line taken from a poem written in a letter to his cousin 
Katherine De Mattos. Indeed, the original verse read: "We cannae38 break the bonds that 
God decreed to bind" (EUP 79). Through his diagnosis of moral insanity, JekyIl does admit 
to having broken "bonds." The "polar twins" are "bound together" in the original self, but 
the potion severs the links: "1 had voluntarily stripped myself of aIl those balancing 
instincts by which ev en the worst of us continues to walk with sorne degree of steadiness 
among temptations" (EUP 59, 67). The result is unrestricted evil: "to be tempted, however 
slightly, was to faIl" (EUP 67). Linehan remarks that "[t]he imagery of the story 
consistently highlights the danger of JekyIl's betrayal of the ties that bind body to soul, self 
to society, and family member to family member" (97).39 The doctor thought he could 
simply release his merely "unjust" self from the shackles of conscience, but failed to 
anticipate that thus unbound, evil could only grow worse. 
38 "cannot." 
39 She mentions, in additions to the passages that 1 have quoted, the "bond of common interest" Jekyll broke 
with Lanyon over their scientific disagreement, when "Mr. Hyde broke out of ail bounds," resulting in Sir 
Danvers Carew's murder, the "house of voluntary bondage" in which Utterson believes he has immured 
himself, and Jekyll 's own words: "the doom and burthen of our life is bound for ever on man 's shoulders" 
as weil as the phrase "a solution of the bonds of obligation," twice repeated (EUP 14, 25, 37, 60, 69; qtd in 
97-98). 
Chapter 3. "Poisonous influences" and "the real Dorian 
Gray": Criminal Responsibility in Oscar 
Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray 
HII était préparé, par tout ce que l 'hérédité et 
l'éducation avaient déposé et développé en lui, 
uniquement à jouir de la vie. Il n'avait appris à lutter 
contre les autres, ni contre lui-même. " 
Léon Lemonnier, La vie d'Oscar Wilde 
The epigraph refers to Oscar Wilde. This very arguable statement originates from a 
1931 narrative which reads more like a nineteenth-century novel than a biography given its 
precise descriptions of local settings and constant attention to morality. Thequotation might 
nevertheless be easily, and more fruitfully, applied to his creation Dorian Gray. Lord Henry, 
Basil Hallward, and himself bring up notions of heredity, intellectual development, 
influence, and race for novel sensations to account for bis deviant lifestyle which 
culminates in crime. 
Like Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray opposes 
nature and nurture. However, nurture must in this case be understood as intellectual 
development rather than social environment (implied in the monster's defence, which lays 
blame on ostracism). Nature is posited against influence resthetic, psychological, genetic 
- which may shape, or more gloomily, determine the criminal's actions. Each character 
defends a different perspective witbin the debate. Basil Hallward claims that Lord Henry's 
influence corrupted Dorian, the second maintains that he has but revealed bis protégé's true 
nature, and finally, the principal intéressé is bent upon rejecting responsibility, a feat he 
manages by blarning a variety of other often deterministic influences, inc1uding his own 
nature. The aristocrat also discusses criminality somewhat independently from his friend's 
situation. His class-based resthetic and political discourse on the subject recalls the author's 
own, as expounded in his non-fiction writing. 
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*** 
In early 1890, Wilde defines and refines his philosophy of life in three pieces of 
writing: a review, an essay, and a novel. Eaming his living as a journalist, he set upon the 
task to "fashio[n] himself a role as a critic" after the well-established Matthew 
Arnold (1822-1888) died (IV xxxiii). He thus started, alongside his more profitable 
occupation, working on longer essays to be published in serious monthlies. In his review of 
Appreciations (1889) - a collection of critical essays by Walter Pater (1839-1894), an 
Oxford professor and celebrated critic whom Wilde deeply admired40 - he requires that, if 
one be called "modem," there is "no mood with, which one cannot sympathize, no dead 
mode of life that one cannot make alive," that "no form of thought is alien, no emotional 
impulse obscure" to one ("Mr. Pater's Appreciations" 189). The preceding review was 
published in the Speaker on March 22, 1890, while he was also writing a dialogue, "The 
True Function and Value of Criticism," which appeared in two instalments (July and 
September) in Nineteenth Century. This long essay is better known as "The Critic as 
Artist," title under which Wilde inc1uded a revised version in his own critical collection 
Intentions (1891). It entrusts to the critic, using the exact same phrases, the task of 
experimenting until he or she has synthesized human history (IV 176-177, 178). In "Dorian 
Gray," which was published the same month as "The True Function"'s first part - though it 
was perhaps written before both the essay and the review (see IV xliv), - the plea for 
similar experimentation issues from Lord Henry Wotton, advocate of a new hedonism.41 
40 Léon Thoorens compares him to the "maître néfaste du Disciple, de Paul Bourget," also a possible 
inspiration for Lord Henry (Thoorens 292). 
41 During this period, Zhuangzi's (4th c. BC) writings also influenced Wilde. In a review published in the 
Speaker on February 8, he speaks of "the ideal of self-culture and self-development, which is the aim of 
his scheme of life, and the basis of his scheme of philosophy" ("A Chinese Sage" 186). This notion is 
distinct from that of experimentation, but will be discussed in reference to individualism and "The Soul of 
Man Under Socialism." 
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The cynical aristocrat suggests new hedonism as a remedy to past "self-torture 
and self-denial" (III 1 08, 278).42 To him, sensorial and resthetic experiences, an integral part 
of enhancing consciousness through the spiritualization of the senses, include "a chance 
tone of colour," "a particular perfume," "a line from a forgotten poem," and "a cadence 
from a piece of music" (III 158, 351). Dorian, for his part, will study and collect perfumes, 
jewels, and clerical vestments, following closely upon Duc Jean Floressas Des Esseintes's 
experimentation in the Frenchman J.-K. Huysmans's novel À rebours (1884). In 1890, 
Wilde was deeply invested in the influential works of Huysmans and Pater, particularly the 
latter's "Conclusion" to his Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873), to define what 
becomes new hedonism in "Dorian Gray." 
On both sides of the Channel, the Decadent artistic movement, of which Pre-
Raphaelite lEstheticism was a precursor, is sufficiently well-known to attract attacks. In the 
collected version of "The Decay of Lying" found in Intentions, Wilde mentions Paul 
Bourget's Le Disciple (1889), in the preface of which the author warns French youth 
against the "stuggle-for-lifer (sic)" and the dilettante, two dangerous influences (IV 80; 
xviii, xx). The first, a "positiviste brutal qui abuse du monde sensuel," bent upon monetary 
success, is less of a threat than the second, who desires to try all things moral and immoral 
for experience's sake (xx). The latter's description fits perfectly Dorian's implementation of 
new hedonism: 
Le bien et le mal, la beauté et la laideur, les vices et les vertus lui paraissent 
des objets de simple curiosité. L'âme humaine tout entière est, pour lui, un 
mécanisme savant et dont le démontage l'intéresse comme un objet 
d'expérience. Pour lui, rien n'est vrai, rien n'est faux, rien n'est moral, rien 
n'est immoral. [ ... ] C'est un égoïste subtil et raffiné dont toute l'ambition [ ... ] 
consiste à «adorer son moi,» à le parer de sensations nouvelles. La vie 
religieuse de l'humanité ne lui est qu'un prétexte à ces sensations-là, comme 
la vie intellectuelle, comme la vie sentimentale. (xix-xx) 
42 The parenthetical references include page numbers for both the 1890 and 1891 editions when the 
quotation is identical. References to the manuscript and the typescript can be found in the bottom portion 
of the first edition. 
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Bourget even mentions the charm of paradoxes wrought by the dilettante's "maitres 
(sic) trop éloquents," a surprisingly accurate designation of Lord Henry's discourse. Ifthese 
correspondences do not confirm Le Disciple as a source, they do demonstrate that Dorian 
and his master were not uncommon types infin-de-siècle Western Europe. 
The quest for ever-new experiences knows no boundaries, be they set by law or by 
moral s, and is thus likely to lead the hedonist upon a criminal path. Jonathan Fryer 
de scribes Dorian Gray as "combining a sophisticated expression of the author's resthetic 
concerns with ablatant disregard for society's values and a taste for criminality" (19). (1 
would argue that Wilde's "resthetic concerns," exposed at length in Intentions, rely 
precisely on a "disregard for society's values.") Indeed, Lord Henry frequently advocates in 
favour of sin. It is key to self-development, which implies a rejection of social norms in 
order to fulfil one's own distinct individual personality. Contrastingly, in a 1891 addition, 
the cynical aristocrat rejects crime on the basis that it is "vulgar" and cannot be mentioned 
after dinner (lII 349). Hence, he does not believe "the real Dorian" to be criminally-
oriented: "People like you - the wilful sunbeams of life - don't commit crimes" (lII 30, 
190; 42, 214). Moreover, Lord Henry reasserts and clarifies his position in the previous 
1891 addition, when his ever young and beautiful friend suggests himself as Basil's 
murderer: "Crime belongs exclusively to the lower orders. [ ... ] 1 should fancy that crime 
was to them what art is to us, simply a method of procuring extraordinary sensations" (lII 
214). Transgression, at the heart of sin and crime, also supplies the foundation of Wilde's 
resthetics. 
Wilde's criticism exposes an analysis of art, criminality, individuality, and 
government which intersects with Lord Henry's. Examining it in detail helps to understand 
Lord Henry's refusaI to recognize Dorian as criminal. In "The Critic as Artist," art's 
immorality lies in its avant-gardiste attitude, defying contemporary conventions and 
guiding humanity towards its betterment, as do sin and crime: 
What is termed Sin is an essential element of progress. [ ... ] By its curiosity 
Sin increases the experience of the race. Through its intensified assertion of 
individualism, it saves us from monotony of type. In its rejection of the 
CUITent notions about morality, it is one with the higher ethics. (IV 148) 
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(Herbert Spencer's concept of race experience shaH be explored later in relation to 
heredity.) Individualism, in Wilde's writings, designates the full development of one's 
individuality by self-affirmation against authority. Art and crime are both "mode [ s] of 
Individualism," according to "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," though the latter is "the 
most intense" because it need not "take cognisance of other people and interfere with 
them" (IV 248). The critical piece first appeared in the Fortnightly Review in February 1891 
and was revised and reprinted in 1895 in a stand-alone volume entitled The Soul of Man. In 
Wilde's writing, the sinner, like the artist, seeks to free himself or herself from 
contemporary constraints, in consequence of what the entire "race" can progress. 
In her "(Con)Textual History" of the aforementioned essay, Josephine Guy explains 
that Individualism was a short-lived political CUITent in England, opposed to any form of 
government, which gained much exposure by the end of the 1880s. Wilde's defmition is 
nevertheless so idiosyncratic that to refer to thls movement in trying to understand his 
argument is almost counterproductive. In fact, he uses the term "individualism" in his 
notebooks before it was applied to the political CUITent (ON 121). In "The Soul of Man," he 
actually subverts the Individualist discourse in advocating for the abolition of private 
property: "it may be asked how Individualism, which is now more or less dependent on the 
existence of private property for hs development, will benefit by [its] abolition" (IV 237). 
Guy acknowledges the reversai, which she takes to be "provocative but not 
profound" (79).43 ln fact, she narrowly defines Wilde's stance as a combination of 
"lndividualist anti-statism with a Socialist critique of private property," conveniently 
allowing for a filiative link to Grant Allen's "Individualism and Socialism," published two 
years earlier in the Contemporary Review (78). With such a restrictive synthe si s, Guy 
occ1udes the notion of self-development. 1 argue, with Nils Clausson, that in "The Soul of 
Man," "Wilde explores the political conditions of self-development" (Clausson 345). Given 
43 Wilde aiso takes up the Individualists' attacks on philanthropy, but couches thern in terrns diarnetrically 
opposed to their "survivai of the fittest" pIea, an additionai subversion which Guy does not point out (74). 
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its consistency with the views expounded in "The Critic as Artist," 1 believe it is central 
to his idiosyncratic use of Individualism. To achieve this state of exalted individuality, Lord 
Henry believes Dorian should be using art rather than crime, given the former's superiority. 
*** 
Wilde's oeuvre relates crime and art in additional ways, not to mention the writer's 
own 'criminal' life as a homosexual. Lord Savile s Crime, his first criminal narrative, was 
serialized in May 1887 in the Court and Society Review and collected in 1891 with three 
other stories. In this short and humorous tale on predestination, dynamiter Herr 
Winckelkopf presents crime as art. Indeed, he refuses to be paid for sending a defective 
bomb-clock to the protagonist's uncle, claiming: "1 do not work for money; 1 live entirely 
for my art" (Sh. Fiction 44). Less anecdotally, Lord Henry's class-based analysis first 
appeared in "Pen, Pencil and Poison" and was subsequently expounded in "The Soul of 
Man." The former, Wilde's second cri minaI narrative, concems Thomas Griffiths 
Wainewright and was published in the January 1889 Fortnightly Review before being 
reprinted in Intentions. Wainewright was a Romantic artist and poisoner, friend to Charles 
Lamb. His existence embodies the close ties between crime and art. 
The description of his "Life" as art, with particular attention set on decoration -
gems, carpets, rare books, engravings, reminds one of Huysmans' Des Esseintes and 
'. prefigures Dorian (IV 108-109). Waineright first "sought to find expression" through 
painting, and much later "by pen or poison," Wilde tells his readers casually (IV 106). His 
crimes were widely known for, as Wilde mentions in his closing remarks, Edward Bulwer-
Lytton and Charles Dickens both fictionalized him, respectively in Lucretia, published in 
1846, and Hunted Dawn, which first appeared in 1859 (IV 122). Nevertheless, the idea that 
one should express one's self through poisoning remains uncanny, though totally consistent' 
with the "modes of Individualism" expounded afterwards in "The Soul of Man." Wilde 
takes Waineright's crimes to have improved his art, endowing his "style" with a 
"personality" which it previously "lacked" (IV 120). There is no need to choose between 
the two means of self-development: they may be combined. 
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As previously announced, the flamboyant Irishman also introduces a class-based 
analysis of criminality in "Pen, Pencil, and Poison." Waineright found deportation, to which 
he was sentenced for forgery, to be a "distasteful" experience given the cultural divide 
separating the poet-poisoner from his fellow inmates: "Crime in England is rarely the result 
of sin. It is nearly always the result of starvation," explains the narrator (IV 119). The critic 
further elaborates upon a quasi identical statement in "The Soul of Man," in which the 
geographical specificity is turned into a historical one: "Starvation, and not sin, is the parent 
of modern crime" (IV 245). Thence, for better or worse, local and contemporary crime is 
not a freely-chosen emancipatory act, nor a sin pushed to the next level. 
True criminals, from imperial Roine and the Italian Renaissance for instance, stand 
out in history as appealing and intriguing characters (IV 121). In contrast, he claims that 
Wainewright's company during deportation lacked men of "psychologically interesting 
nature" (IV 120). Shedding light upon this cryptic claim, the author contends in "The Soul 
of Man" that "our criminals are, as a class, so absolutely uninteresting from any 
psychological point of view" when contrasted with literature's "marvellous Macbeths and 
terrible Vautrins," being nothing more than "ordinary, respectable, commonplace people" 
that have "not got enough to eat" (IV 245). One may thus assume that hungry persons 
simply act predictably and rationally, theft being more useful than dying lawfully. In 
contrast, no predictable force, such as reason, guides truly evil crirninals, who thus offer 
interesting psychological studies. Hence, Wilde wrote in a letter to the editor of the· St 
James s Gazette in defence of "Dorian Gray": "Bad people are, from the point of view of 
art, fascinating studies. They represent colour, variety and strangeness" (CL 430). To be the 
object of a Wildean novel, Dorian must be, like Wainewright, a sinner rather than a pauper. 
Wilde's social analysis of criminality stretches beyond economic issues of poverty 
intopolitico-Iegal discussions of penology. Indeed, he speaks of punishment as another 
parent to crime, apart from sin and starvation, succinctly summing up their relation as 
"[t]he less punishment, the less crime" (IV 245). He took the idea down in rus 
Commonp/ace Book from Spencer's The Study of Sod%gy, in which the synthetic 
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philosopher refers to Sir Samuel Romilly's turn-of-the-nineteenth-century "great 
amelioration" of the criminallaw and its role in decreasing crime rates (ON 177; The Study 
ofSociology 12).44 However, Spencer further explains that crime's cause lies in "an inferior 
mode of life," itself a consequence of an "original inferiority of nature" (The Study of 
Sociology 330). Wilde's assessment of criminality, which underscores superior 
Individualism, does not sit weIl with a discourse of congenital inferiority. It nevertheless 
gains in clarity when informed by a similar but more elaborate argument. Another source 
than Spencer must be sought to better make sense of Wilde's belief in a proportional 
relation between crime and punishment. 
Severe and brutal punishment's repea1 was quite consensua1 ever since the Classical 
school of criminology, pioneered by penologists Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, 
reformed penal policy across Europe at the end of the Enlightenment. Hence, Wilde's 
source may issue from aU categories of the politica1 spectrum. Guy reads his rejection of 
"Authoritarian" socialism, and aU forms of authority, in relation to British 
Individua1ism (Wilde, IV 233). However, in his case, it is much more consistent with an 
anarchist stance. lndeed, Wilde later came to view anarchism in continuum with socialism, 
confiding in a 1894 interview that he thought of himself as "more than a Socialist," i.e. 
"something of an Anarchist" (Almy 232). As David Goodway points out, anarchists have 
recognized "The Soul of Man" as an important text from the onset (63). For instance, Peter 
Kropotkin, whom Wilde described in De Profundis as leading one "of the most perfect lives 
[he hadJ come across in [his] own experience," referred to "The Soul of Man Under 
Socialism" as "that article that O. Wilde wrote on Anarchism - in which there are sentences 
worth being engraved, like verses from the Koran are engraved in Moslem lands" (II 124, 
184; Ross 113). lnterestingly, Goodway reveals that "the principle political and economic 
debt" in the text Kropotkin regards as almost sacred is to the Russian himself, both 
44 Guy scolds Smith and Helfand for having occluded the political aspects of Wilde's engagement with 
Herbert Spencer by concentrating simply on questions of biology (84n37). She contends that "the 
Individualists' appropriation of Spencer explicitly politicized his work," yet this process came a few years 
after Wilde had filled his notebooks (74). 
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anarchist and non-anarchist commentators have found (74). Guy does list Kropotkin's 
name first in her enumeration of potential sources but, in a footnote, she dismisses the 
anarchist interpretation as simply "fashionable" in the mid-twentieth century (66, 83n25). 
Close reading rather proves that Wilde's criminological position may likely owe much to 
Kropotkin's argument. 
In 1886, Prince Pyotr Alexeyevich Kropotkin, newly established in Britain, 
published a revolutionary pamphlet entitled Law and Authority: An Anarchist Essay. In its 
fourth and fmal chapter, he refutes the need for three types of law he identifies: those on 
property, those· on government, and those on "penalties and misdemeanours" (23). 
Kropotkin supports Spencer and Wilde's argument regarding severe punishment's 
inefficacy in preventing crime - with a more thorough explanation than theirs. 
Kropotkin and Spencer are nonetheless opposed on other criminological debates.45 
Hence, whereas Spencer states that a "cri minai aggressor would not commit a crime if he 
were quite certain to be caught and punished," Kropotkin, in a sirnilarly unsupported 
statement, daims the opposite: "it is also a well-known fact that the fear of punishment has 
never stopped a single murderer. He who kills his neighbour from revenge or misery does 
not reason much about consequence" (The Study of Soci%gy 385; 21). Is the criminal a 
rational being, as the Classical school posited and Spencer agreed, or are its psychological 
motives more complex than utilitarian philosophers affrrm? 
Wilde does not address the issue of reason, but agrees with Kropotkin in bis 
Commonp/ace Book, comparing the "incapacity of severe criminal legislation to produce 
higher morality or even order" with the inefficiency of the fear of Hell religion attempts to 
inspire, demonstrating human nature's "showy indifference to any system of rewards and 
45 In Modern Science and Anarchism, tirst published in Russian in 1901 and translated in English in 1903, 
Kropotkin takes issue witb Spencer's inconsistent methodology in bis attempt to construct a synthetic 
philosophy (giving up "his rigorously scÏentitic metbod" for the "the method of analogies" in the study of 
societies) as well as with bis understanding of "the struggle for existence" as centred strictly around 
competition (40-42). In his major essay Mutua/ Aid (1902), he suggests cooperation as an alternative 
survival, and thus evolutional, mechanism. 
punishments either heavenly or terrestrial" (ON 115). It thus appears safe to assume 
that, if anything, Wilde follows Kropotkin rather than Spencer. 
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Both Wilde and Kropotkin understand private property and ensuing inequalities to 
be the ultimate cause of nearly aIl crimes. The Irish writer states that, when private property 
is abolished, criminality "will cease to exist" because it shall become unnecessary (IV 245). 
A reference to jealousy as both "an extraordinary source of crime in modem life" and "an 
emotion closely bound up with our conceptions of property" supplements the simplistic and 
hast y conclusion (IV 245, 246). Kropotkin is slightly more explicit, stating (without 
supporting evidence) that two thirds to three quarters of assaults are the result of crimes 
against property rather than directly against persons (21). Like Wilde, he links violent crime 
to feelings beyond hunger. Indeed, he claims, again without any reference, that general 
unhappiness is statistically proven to be a factor: "when the harvest is good and provisions 
are at an obtainable price, and when the sun shines, men, lighter hearted and less miserab1e 
than usual, do not give way to gloomy passions, do not from tri~ial motives, plunge a knife 
into the bosom of a fellow creature" (21). Yet private property's abolition does not suffice: 
punishment must also be repealed. 
"The Soul of Man"'s argument in favour of revoking punishment becomes clearer 
when read in light of Kropotkin's rejection of law as a whole. Wilde and Kropotkin do not 
simply portray punishment as ineffective, but also as a direct cause of crime. Wilde opens 
ms discussion on penology with a vague statement: "a community is infinitely more 
brutalised by the habituaI employment of punishment than it is by the occasional 
occurrence of crime" (IV 245). The words "brutalised" and "habituaI" echo Kropotkin's: he 
contends that punishment's disappearance will diminish the number of murders by putting a 
stop to the production of "habituaI criminals, who have been brutalised in prison" (22). 
Indeed; they are "deprived of freedom and shut up with other depraved beings, steeped in 
the vice and corruption which oozes from the very walls of our existing prisons" (23). This 
stance recalls the position Friedrich Schiller defends in "Der Verbrecher aus verlorene 
Ehre" (see Chapter 1), and eerily anticipates closing verses in Wilde's Reading Gaol: 
The vilest deeds like poison weeds 
Bloom well in prison-air: 
It is only what is good in Man 
That wastes and withers there: 
[ ... ] 
And sorne grow made, and all grow bad (I559-562, 569) 
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In a 1894 interview, he had spoken of the "perfect fiasco" which the Victorian penal 
administration had become: '''It is a sign of a noble nature to refuse to be broken by force.' 
'Never attempt to reform a man,' he said; 'men ne ver repent'" (Almy 232, 233). Prison 
corrupts more than it reforms.46 
According to· both men, the redress against criminality is the abolition of private 
property and punishment. Crime would disappear, or subsist "as a very distressing form of 
dementia, to be cured by care and kindness" under the guidance of physicians, writes 
Wilde (IV 245). Kropotkin's "remedy" is nearly identical for he deems the criminal to be 
"simply unfortunate": he pre scribes "the most brotherly care" and a "treatment based on 
equality" (23). Only criminogenic mental disease would be left: crime arising from 
necessity and sin would disappear with poverty and morals in Wilde's political utopia, 
shared with Lord Henry: a non-authoritarian society that enables individuals to grow to 
their fullest potential. Nevertheless, hunger, jealousy, economic difficulties, imprisonment, 
or bad weather can hardly account for Lord Savile's, Wainewright's, and Doriàn's crimes. 
Perhaps they do not enter this understanding of real-life criminality because they are 
literary figures. During his first trial, Wilde insisted that fiction and life function differently. 
His fictional criminals perhaps operate according to Gide's "immoralité supérieure": the 
origin of both their crimes and art - painting and writing in Wainewright's case and Life in 
Gray's ("to him Life was the first, the greatest, of the arts") - is a certain "attitude of mind" 
46 Foucault underscores that this critique, one offive, has been repeatedly fonnulated since the prison system 
has been implemented. 
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which offends society (Gide 184; Wilde, IV 107, 278; Ziolkowski 311). Gide assumes 
that wisdom relegates laws and moral sense to a temporary role as "éducatrices" (183). 
Wilde expresses an analogous ide a in relation to conscience in "The Critic as Artist." He 
deems its "mere existence" to be "a sign of our imperfect development," for it should rather 
be instinctual (IV 148). In order to ignore exterior authorities, humans must develop their 
own individual authority. 
*** 
Now for the main text: The Picture of Dorian Gray. Basil and Lord Henry play out 
the nature versus nurture debate in their disagreement about Dorian's transformation from 
innocent philanthropist to callous cynic. The former sets his friend apart from other men for 
his "fine" nature which renders him incapable of "bring[ing] misery upon any one" (III 54, 
234). The admirer treats Dorian's "indifference" regarding his fiancée Sibyl Vane's suicide 
as "merely a mood," unrepresentative of his unalterable nature, itself too full of goodness 
and nobility (III 87,261). More generally, he blames on Lord Henry's "influence," taken to 
have corrupted Dorian, the discrepancies between his behaviour and his pure heart (III 85, 
260). The painter confronts his Oxford friend immediately when he notices, upon 
completing his masterpiece, that his model's mood has altered. He is suddenly and 
surprisingly lamenting the eventual waning of his beautifu1 youth and curses the portrait 
and its maker for offering an everlasting measure of his bodily corruption. Lord Henry 
dismisses the 'bad influence' accusation with the daim that this novel attitude reflects "the 
real Dorian Gray" (III 30, 190). Hence, Basil and Lord Henry disagree on their friend's true 
nature. 
Basil b1ames Dorian's 10ss of innocence on Lord Henry's nurturing. The reproach 
piques the hedonist because he regards any form of influence as "immoral" (III20, 183). In 
the manuscript, Wilde first wrote: 
"[ ... ] to influence a person is to give him one's own soul. He does not think 
his own thoughts, or bum with his own passions. His virtues are not natural 
to him. His sins, if there are such things as sins, are borrowed. He becomes 
an echo of sorne one else's music, an actor of a part that has not been 
written for him." (III 20, emphasis added) 
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While revising his manuscript, Wilde crossed out the two italicized "own"'s to replace them 
with "natural."47 The modification problematizes the property ofthe "borrowed" "thoughts" 
and "passions": though they be not "natural," do they become one's "own" once one has 
been influenced? Or does the revision invalidate the concept of private property altogether 
in metaphysics? 
The immorality of influence lies in the usurpation of another person's personality, 
complete with its "thoughts," "passions," "virtues," and "sins." Such an invasion runs 
counter to Wilde's notion of individualism detailed in "The Soul of Man": "All imitation in 
morals and in life is wrong. [ ... ] There is no one type for man. There are as many 
perfections as there are imperfect men" (IV 243). The unwelcome influence in this case 
erupts from governmentallaws and social customs, which impede their subjects' personal 
growth by restricting the realm of possible actions and thoughts. According to Lord Henry, 
the "aim of life" is precisely "[t]o realize oneself perfectly" through "self-development," a 
wording Wilde changed to "one's nature" while revising the manuscript (11120, emphasis 
added). Twice did the author tum notions of property and identity into references to nature. 
It may be assumed that one's character traits and behaviours are "natural" as long as they 
are consistent with one's "nature," which one must develop, aiming to realize it perfectly. 
The various uses of "deep" and "shallow" imply a distinction between two types of 
natures.48 Indeed, it seems as though a deep nature allows one to cumulate a multitude of 
experiences as natural, whereas a shallow nature is restricted to a certain defined type. It 
thus follows that influence, according to the hedonist, designates the - immoral -
imposition of one's character upon another person endowed with a shallow nature. 
Reflecting on his own ascendancy over Dorian, Lord Henry contends that "[h]e had made 
47 Perhaps not to repeat the same adjective a third time, Wilde changed the italicized "natural" in the quote to 
"real." 
48 Consider the use ofboth words on pages 39 and 212, and that of "shallow" on pages 85 and 259 as weil as 
on 121 and 288. 
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him," speaking ofhim as his "creation" and avoiding the term 'influence' (III 47, 218). 
One gifted with a deep nature cannot be influenced, for all poses are natural to him or her. 
Considering others' demands interferes with self-development. Lord Henry explains 
in a lengthy addition to the 1891 edition that "Individualism" involves being "in harmony 
with one's self," whereas morality forces one "to be in harmony with others" (III 235). 
Wilde, like his character, rejects any concession to external demands. Hence, in "The Soul 
of Man", he deems "immoral" (a term which recalls Lord Henry's condemnation of 
influence), "ridiculous," "corrupting," and "contemptible" the authority which the public 
attempts to assert upon the artist (IV 248). Development must come from within - though 
Lord Henry implies it may be suggested from without, as he does with Dorian. 
Minds, just like living organisms, must be free from external constraints in order to 
evolve, for complexity arises internally, or so Wilde believes. Though Charles Darwin made 
it c1ear that natural selection only describes the evolution of beings other than human, a 
variety of philosophers applied his evolutionary theory to races, culture, and even ideas: 
"The idea of evolution as a movement from simplicity to complexity pervaded aU are as of 
scientific thought in the nineteenth century" (Haley 221).49 For instance, by drawing a four-
point analogy between society and organisms, Herbert Spencer manages to universalize 
natural selection to a wide array of phenomena ("The Social Organism" 395-396).50 In his 
Commonplace Book, Wilde noted: "Progress in thought is the assertion of individualism 
against authority, and progress in matter is differentiation and specialisation of function: 
those organisms which are entirely subject to external influences do not progress any more 
than a mind entirely subject to authority" (ON 121). Analogies between biology and 
psychology are quite common throughout his Oxford note books; nineteenth-century 
49 See Wilde's entry in his Commonplace Book entitled "Survival of Fittest in thought" and further remarks: 
"Hegelian dialectic is the natural selection produced by a struggle for existence in world of thought" (ON 
121,149). 
50 Wilde draws from Spenser's The Study of Sociology to make similar points in his Commonplace 
Book (ON 109-11 0, see notes on 175-176). 
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thought had a penchant for synthesis. 51 Biology and history are also paralleled in the 
Commonplace Book as "the passage from cantonal individuality to national unit y" IS 
equated with "the evolution of multicellular organisms from unicellular" (ON 117). In SUffi, 
biology, psychology, and history all follow the same universallaws. 
Wilde's "Historical Criticism"52 essay, submitled to the Chancellor's English Essay 
prize in 1879, exemplifies external influence's detrimental impact with a short case study of 
the decline of Greek historical criticism after Thucydides (5 th century BC), author of the 
History of the Peloponnesian War, and before Polybius (2nd century BC), father to the 
, notion of political balance in the govemment. He names two perverse trends external to the 
Greek spirit in historical criticism: the rhetorician Isocrates (mid-5 th century to mid-
4th century BC) - responsible for the appreciation of contemporary historians according to 
"the goodness of the Greek they write" rather than "their power of estimating evidence" -
and the founding of Alexandria (332 BC) by Alexander the Great - which "diverted the 
critical tendencies of the Greek spirit into questions of grammar, philology and the 
like" (IV 42). The opposition between Polybius's birthplace - "the serene and pure air of 
the clear uplands of Arkadeia" which are "the very heart of Greece" - and "the sophists of 
Athens" or "the hot sands of Egypt" underscores the latler's external- or at least peripheral 
- situation with regards to the true Greek spirit (IV 42). In conclusion, external influences 
impede progress in aU spheres, according to Lord Henry and to Wilde's early writing. 
*** 
In contrast, Dorian welcomes influence as an excuse to deflect responsibility, almost 
casting the Other as sinner rather than himself. From the moment Dorian notices the change 
on his portrait and becomes conscious that he has acted reproachfuUy when heartlessly 
51 Wilde writes in his Notebook Kept at Oxford: "the force of analogy[,] the desire to bring ail one[']s 
thoughts into hannony, and mutual correspondance (sic), have led men to infer that the reign of Law 
which is the tirst message of physical science, is also to be extended to those phenomena which seem the 
most remote from Law" (ON 172). 
52 The essay is best known by the title "The Rise of Historical Criticism," assigned to the tirst of the text's 
three parts wh en privately printed by Sherwood Press in 1905 (IV xxiv). 
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breaking off his engagement with Sibyl, he consistently places the blame for his 
"cruelty" outside of himself (lII 67, 246). He successively blames Sibyl for disappointing 
him ("It was the girl's fault, not his"), his Maker for endowing him with "such a soul," and 
Sibyl once more for making him suffer "reon upon reon of torture53" (lII 67, 246). Such 
ramblings and mental detours are consistent with his usual thought process when distressed. 
Furthermore, with no self-assertion, Dorian seems totally devoid of internaI "will or 
intention" - concepts which Lord Henry incidentally rejects54 - and dependant upon 
exterior forces to develop in any capacity (lII 158, 351). For instance, only a «higher 
influence" could ennoble his "unreal and selfish love" for Sibyl (lII 72, 250, emphasis 
added). Dorian projects all ultimate causes outside of himself, incidentally displacing the 
blame onto an Other. 
Dorian henceforth refuses any form of responsibility, particularly in decision-
making. He will not own up to his choices, presenting them as not even ms own: "He felt 
that the time had really come for making ms choice. Or had his choice already been made? 
Yes, life had decided that for him,-life, and his own infinite curiosity about life" (lII 82, 
257).55 He first blamed the choice of living a life of "infinite passion, pleasures subtle and 
secret, wild joys and wilder sins" ascribed to his "infinite curiosity about life" upon Sibyl's 
death in childish accusations. He c1aimed that she had acted in a "selfish" manner by killing 
herself because until then she counterpoised Lord Henry's "wrong, fascinating, poisonous, 
delightful theories" and could have thus kept Dorian "straight" (lII 76, 253; 55, 235). 
53 The manuscript reads "suffering." 
54 Lord Henry's materialist stance concords with Wilde's notes on Edward Bumett Tylor's Primitive 
Culture (1871). Indeed, he put down in his Notebook KepI al Oxford: "in the study of man we must put 
aside any ideas of extra-natural interference and causeless spontaneity," of which an example is a 
"motiveless will" (ON 154, partly quoting Tylor 3). 
55 1 disagree with Sheldon W. Liebman, who fails to acknowledge that Dorian is refusing responsibility. He 
rather contends that "Dorian realizes that he has already made the choice to follow Henry rather than 
Basil" (308, emphasis added). If Dorian has himself "made the choice," why would he then state that "life 
had decided that for him"? 
Dorian will under no circumstance allow to be held accountable for his lifestyle, 
attitude, and their consequences, but does acknowledge they are problematic. 
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Interestingly, the young man's reliance on Sibyl to resist hedonist temptation 
demonstrates that she rapidly displaced Basil's "idealism" as a challenger to the hegemony 
of Lord Henry's "scientific materialism" (Seagroatt 743). The painter's "compliments,,,56 
according to the narrator's earlier report of Dorian's own understanding, "had not 
influenced his nature" the way Lord Henry's "strange panegyric on youth" and "terrible 
waming of its brevity"57 impressed and affected him (III 28, 189).58 Addressing his new-
found mentor, the young man contends that he would not have discovered Sibyl without 
him. Indeed, he traces his "passion for sensations" to the men's first meeting: "You filled 
me with a wild desire to know everything about life" (III 38, 211). Hence, all blame 
ultimately reverts to the aristocrat and his theories. 
The bond of disciple to master resists total dissolution. As Dorian reflects on the 
possibility of self-reform, successive authorial rewritings subtly confirm a reading 
according to which he is too fond of Lord Henry to refrain from seeing him. Indeed, the 
manuscript reads: "He would not see Lord Henry any more, or listen to that subtle 
poisonous voice that in Basil Hallward's garden had first stirred within him the passion for 
impossible things" (III 68). The "or" seems to convey the meaning of a "nor," but Wilde 
added "at any rate" immediately after on the manuscript, making the disjunction's negation 
sound more like the negation of only the second element (III 68). In the published versions, 
"-would not" replaces the aforementioned coordinating conjunction (III 68, 246). The em 
56 The manuscript reads "panegyrics." 
57 The manuscript reads "terrible account of the horrors of old age.". 
58 Though Dorian is very attached to Lord Henry, his affection is contained within the boundaries of 
friendship (whereas Basil is in love with the former). Indeed, in a sentence Wilde deleted in the typescript, 
the young man reports that "[h]e felt no romance for him" (III 91). The passage was most likely removed 
for its direct homosexual implications rather than an incorrect rendit ion of Dorian's feelings. The 
subsequent explanation according to which Lord Henry is "too clever and too cynical to be really fond of' 
is maintained through ail versions (III 91). 
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dash along with the verb's repetition give the impression that Dorian has retracted from 
his first thought (not to "see Lord Henry any more") and reformulated it in more viable 
terms: to continue on seeing him, yet without listening to his "voice," which Wilde changed 
to "views" on the manuscript and to "theories" on the typescript (III 68). Dorian knows 
both that he is subjected to Lord Henry's influence and that it' is nefarious to him, yet he 
cannot resist, confirming his malleability. 
Nevertheless, Dorian does not simply replicate Lord Henry's theories, do es not 
imitate him beyond his "speech mannerisms," as Lawler puts it (An Inquiry 126). He rather 
enacts what his mentor has told him, bringing "a zeal for direct action" to his theories and 
aiming for "a life of performance not speculation" (An Inquiry 124, 126). Contemplation or 
being "merely the spectator of life" is indeed the renunciation of which Lord Henry is 
found guilty in Wilde's moral: "He finds that those who reject the battle are more deeply 
wounded than those who take part in it" (CL 430). The narrative unfolding further 
, 
demonstrates that Dorian's relationship to Lord Henry is conflictuaL First set upon 
following his counsels, the younger man ends up changing his mind, as though he were 
struggling to either assert his individuality or to comply to his own conscience. Speaking of 
his delightful Sibyl, the young man earnestly repeats his tessons to his master: ~'I don't 
think 1 am likely to marry, Harry. 1 am too much in love. That is one of your 
aphorisms" (III 37, 210). Wilde emphasized that Dorian brings praxis to Lord Henry's 
theories by adding in the typescript: "1 am putting it into practice, as 1 do everything you 
say" (III 37). Nonetheless, on the very same evening, Lord Henry receives a telegram 
announcing Dorian and Sibyl's engagement (Ill 49, 220). Hence, Dorian does not always 
follow blindly Lord Henry's teachings. 
The mentor's direct influence wanes after Sibyl's death but extends indirectly with 
his gift, the yellow book. The French novel is a cadeau empoisonné. 59 Dorian is said to 
have been "poisoned by a book," an analogy with the Renaissance's "strange manners of 
59 Jacques Derrida discusses the ambiguity of gifts in his commentary of Plato's Phedra, "La pharmacie de 
Platon." 
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poisoning": "by a helmet and a lighted torch, by an embroidered glove and a jewelled 
fan, by a gilded pomander and by an amber chain" (111 125, 290). Louis Courtadon, in a 
1912 article, raises doubts on such poisoning methods' existence. Indeed, he relegates to the 
realm of legend perfume poisonings such as Jeanne d'Albret's death to perfumed gloves, 
pope Clement VII's to a poisonous torch's fumes, and the Cardinal of Lorraine's to the 
deadly fumes of go Id coins wrought especially for him (191). The same Italian perfumer 
who is believed to have presented Jeanne d'Albret with the poisonous gloves is also 
accused of giving a similarly deadly po mander to Louis de Bourbon, Prince de 
Condi (Lucas 166). Hence, in a number of cases, poison is believed to have been delivered 
through gifts, an interesting paralle1 with the yellow book. 
*** 
Dorian seems to agree with Basil that nurture is at least partly to blame, yet he does 
not dissociate himse1f from Lord Henry's heritage, only from the implication that he was a 
simple puppet. In answer to the painter's request for "the Dorian Gray [he] used to paint,"60 
the young man signaIs his autonomy and explains that he has changed: "1 have developed. 1 
was a school-boy when you knew me. 1 am a man now. 1 have new passions, new thoughts, 
new ide as" (111 260; 87, 261). Furthermore, nature does enter into Dorian's rationale 
concerning rus behaviour. He claims he must resist more than Lord Henry and his toxic 
gift's influence: "the still more poisonous influences that came from his own temperament" 
hold sway over him (11196, 269). Hence, he does not frnd rus nature blameless. 
Nineteenth-century scientific discourse frequently traced one's actions to one's 
constitution, undermining free will. For instance, in accord with his materialist ideology 
rejecting "will or intention," Lord Henry locates the seat of "thought" and "passion," which 
govern life, in "nerves, and fibres, and slowly built-up cells" (111 158, 351). In a Darwinist 
phase during his philosophical and spiritual experimentation, Dorian took "a curious 
pleasure in tracing the thoughts and passions of men to sorne pearly cell in the brain, or 
60 The 1890 version reads "the Dorian Gray 1 used to know" (III 85). 
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sorne white61 nerve in the body" (III 111, 280). "Thought" and "passion" connect to the 
body, and can thus be inherited, have deduced Victorian thinkers. According to Gilbert in 
"The Critic as Artist," heredity not only determines eye and hair colour, but passes down 
"subjective" gifts: "strange temperaments and subtle susceptibilities," "wild ardours and 
chill moods of indifference," "complex multiform gifts of thoughts that are at variance with 
each other, and passions that war against themselves" (IV 177). While visiting his farnily's 
portrait-gallery, Dorian similarly muses on the possibility that his character might have 
been passed down from his ancestors (III 121-122, 188-189). With Wilde, experiences 
influence the race beyond the individual through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
Incidentally, his fictional character blames ancestry and its impact on his "temperament" to 
endlessly evade accountability. 
Philip E. Smith II and Michael S. Helfand, who have edited Wilde's Oxford 
notebooks, contend that he integrated Hegelian idealism and positivist evolution, following 
mathematician and philosopher William Kingdon Clifford's Lectures and Essays (1879), 
yet added the notion of evolution towards greater perfection throughout history (ON viii, 
29-32). Smith concisely surnmarizes their view: "Wilde's resthetic and critical theory 
envisioned the progressive and self-conscious development of human culture through 
evolutionary mechanisms recognized as valid by Victorian scientists" (30). Indeed, races 
improve by inheriting acquired characteristics according to Wilde. 
Wilde discusses the inheritance of acquired traits mechanics in his Commonplace 
Book. He wrote in the very last note: "certain material changes exterior to our organism are 
always accompanied by certain other material changes inside our organism" (ON 152). 
Again, once transformations are inscribed within one's body, it may be supposed that they 
can be passed onto one's descendants. Acquired characteristics in one generation become 
innate in the next. In a note on "English Thought from Bacon," Wilde narrates in dialectic 
terms - and celebrates - the return of "Innate Ideas (sic)" in philosophy: on 
61 1. M. Stoddart, an American managing editor at Lippincott, changed "ivory" to "pearly" and "scarlet" to 
"white" on the typescript. 
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"transcendental" grounds with Immanue1 Kant and his "forms or categories of thought" 
and on "Biological Grounds (SiC)"62 with Spencer and the "hereditary transmission of 
concepts" (ON 120).63 AU humans are thus born with a store of knowledge which depends 
upon their race: "the experience of the race having been substituted for the experience of 
the individual, necessary truths are admitted to be a-priori to the individual, though a-
posteriori to the race" (ON 133-134).64 Wilde refers to this notion ofrace-experience in his 
apology of Sin in "The Soul of Man" quoted previously. The individual sinner's personal 
growth enriches his or her race's experience, provided that he or she does have children. 
Otherwise, his or her acquired development cannot be passed on biologicaUy. 
Renee, Dorian's understanding of the human psyche combines inheritance with 
multiplicity, recalling Lord Henry's notion of "deep" nature. Pathologies and acquired 
psychological traits are passed on to form "a being with myriad lives and myriad 
sensations, a complex multiform creature that bore within itself strange legacies of thought 
and passion65, and whose very flesh was tainted with the monstrous maladies of the 
dead" (III 121, 288).66 The "myriad lives" recaU Gilbert's daim in "The Critic as Artist" 
that the presence of our ancestors' experiences within our soul "enables us to live [their] 
countless lives" (IV 178). A baby is thence far from a blank slate: it has the potential to 
develop into aU its ancestors. Human beings are thus both physiologicaUy and 
62 Capitalization (and punctuation) are quite random in the notebooks. 
63 Spencer presents his "general doctrine" as a "reconciliation between the experience-hypothesis [Locke] as 
commonly interpreted, and the hypothesis which the transcendentalists oppose to it" and refers specitically 
to Kant's "forms of thought" in his text (The Princip/es of Psych%gy 465, 466). 
64 Wilde is likely following Clifford's presentation of Spencer's ideas in Lectures and Essays: "The 
perceptions, not only of former generations of men, but of those lower organisms from which they were 
originally derived, beginning even with the tirst molecule that was complex enough to preserve records of 
its own changes; ail these have been built into the organism, have determined its character, and have been 
handed down to us by hereditary descent" (278-279). 
65 The typescript read "creature with myriad lives and myriad passions, a complex multiform being that bore 
within itselfstrange legacies ofthought" before Wilde revised it (emphasis added). 
66 The wording echoes that of the passage in "The Critic as Artist" previously referred to, with the use of 
"complex multiform" and "maladies" (IV 177). 
psychologically the products and sum of their ancestry's experiences. The ri cher the 
stock, the further he or she can push back the boundaries of human experience. 
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Evolution increases the availability, for an individual, of thoughts and passions 
through the accretion of past experiences, both through genetic and imaginary genealogy. 
Indeed, Dorian does not restrict the concept to biological lineage: "one had ancestors in 
literature, as well as in one's own race, nearer perhaps in type and temperament, many of 
them, and certainly with an influence of which one was more absolutely conscious" (III 
122, 289). He repeatedly imagines himself as reliving literary and historical characters' 
lives, be they his "prefiguring type" - his French novel 's Pari sian hero, - Roman emperors, 
or Italian Renaissance despots (111105,276; 122-125,289-290). In his criticism, Wilde also 
details an unorthodox conception of heredity. The coupling of biological and literary 
genealogy echoes "Historical Criticism": "[t]he principle of heredity can be exemplified in 
literature as well as in organic life: Aristotle, Plato and Polybius are the lineal ancestors of 
Fichte and Hegel, of Vico and Cousin, of Montesquieu and De Tocqueville" (IV 41). 
Literature must not be understood in relation to resthetics, to beauty, but rather to 
experience and to imagination, which, according to Gilbert in "TheCritic as Artist," is 
"concentrated race-experience" resulting from heredity (IV 178). Nevertheless, while 
heredity affords imagination ever growing latitude by preceding personal experimentation 
with a stock of accumulated experiences, it constrains action. 
During the 19th century, positivism repeatedly challenged free will. The loss may 
only be temporary: 
There are moments, psychologists tell us, when the passion for sin, or for 
what the world calls sin, so dominates a nature that every fibre of the body, 
as every cell of the brain, seems to be instinct with fearful impulses. Men 
and women at such moments lose the freedom of their will. They move to 
their terrible end as automatons move (III 330). 
This passage of a chapter added to the 1891 edition circumscribes within time the 
disintegration of one's control over one's body. In Primitive Culture, Tylor presents 
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biological determinism as an empirically and universally observed perpetuaI 
phenomenon: "None will deny that, as each man knows by the evidence of his own 
consciousness, definite and natural cause does, to a great extent, determine human 
action" (3). The fictional Gilbert in "The Critic as Artist" pushes the argument further and 
contends that "the scientific principle of Heredity" has freed humanity from the "burden of 
moral responsibility" by robbing "activity of its choice" (IV 1 77). According to Wilde, 
heredity has a deterministic influence on action. 
Determinism not only annihilates accountability, but also renders the future 
inescapable. The narrator speaks ominously of Dorian's future: "There were passions in 
him that would find their terrible outlet, dreams that would make the shadow of their evil 
real" (Il/96, 270, emphasis added). The extent of Dr. Sixte's fatalism in Le Disciple is quite 
extraordinary, which illustrates how far determinism could be pushed in thefin de siècle: 
« Si nous connaissions vraiment la position relative de tous les phénomènes 
qui constituent l'univers actuel, - nous pourrions, dès à présent, calculer 
avec une certitude égale à celle des astronomes le jour, l'heure, la minute où 
l'Angleterre par exemple, évacuera les Indes, où l'Europe aura brûlé son 
dernier morceau de houille, où tel criminel, encore à naître, assassinera son 
père, où tel poème, encore à concevoir, sera composé. L'avenir tient dans le 
présent comme toutes les propriétés du triangle tiennent dans sa 
défmition ... » (Bourget 21-22) 
The future's inevitability serves as premise for Wilde's first take on the causes of crime: his 
short story Lord Savile s Crime. In its second publication, the subtitle was changed from "A 
Study of Cheiromancy (sic)" to "A Study of Dut y" (Sh. Fiction 6). This ironic subtitle 
refers to Lord Savile's self-imposed duty to, before he marries, realize the inevitable yet 
dreadful act written upon his hand. In his introduction to Primitive Culture, Tylor mentions 
disdainfully "the list of dissertations on supernatural intervention and natural causation, on 
liberty, predestination, and accountability" (3). The topic which forms the substance of the 
short story's plot was thus already popular by the 1870s. 
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In this first take on crime, Wilde treats murder lightly, offering it as the object of 
a self-fulfilling prophecy and a dreadful reversaI of fate for the chiromancer. Lord Savile 
attempts to kill two relatives but fails miserably. He nevertheless manages to fulfil his 
destiny by pushing the psalmist into the Thames in a lonely nighttime encounter. Belief in a 
metaphysical determinism is thus shown to be the cause of a crime without which it would 
never even have been imagined (see especiaHy Sh. Fiction 27). Yet this curiously does not 
evacuate duty. Predestination may serve the plot's comic reversaI, yet the protagonist's 
attitude offers a striking contrast with Dorian's. Indeed, Lord Savile feels the responsibility 
to measure up to his predetermined destiny without cowering away while Dorian uses 
determinism to deny accountability. 
In other cases, the horrific actions which result from fatalist theories prompt a re-
evalution. In Le Disciple, remorse overcomes Dr. Sixte, formerly a "négateur de toute 
liberté," when he realizes that in the end his doctrines of moral relativity and absolute 
determinism have corrupted a "caractère [ ... ] dangereux par nature" (321). The young 
disciple Robert Greslou's psychological experimentation in the seduction of a young lady 
ends with her suicide.67 As Ruth Harris aptly describes, "the abstract appreciation of mental 
operations" lead him "to excuse his own immoral acts as the result of ineluctable 
necessity" (316). AH in aH, theoretical principles justifying (non-)responsibility are but a 
façade: personal ethics control the bottom-line. 
*** 
67 Scholars depicting Lord Henry as conducting a scientific experirnent through Dorian have surprisingly 
overlooked Le Disciple, which off ers an example of such a plot (Clausson 252-253; Seagroatt 742-743). 
French critics have pointed out promising analogies. Catherine Lingua suggests a comparison between 
Lord Henry and Dr. Sixte on the basis that they both excel "dans l'étude et le maniement d'une âme 
vivante" and that Wilde might have read Le Disciple while preparing Dorian Gray (118). In addition, 
Gérard Pey let draws a parallel between Greslou and Lord Henry's "démon de l'analyse" (128). 
Furthermore, the writers befriended in the 1880s (Sherard 242; Mansuy 280n73, 382). Finally, Bourget 
shared on May 12, 1895 in the Figaro reflections Wilde's trial inspired him (Carassus 266). 
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First laid out by Lord Henry and subsequently brought to life through the 
influence of the protagonist of a French book, depraved ancestors scrutinized in portraits, 
and decadent historical figures witnessed through literature, new hedonism only accounts 
for Dorian's sinful life, not his murderous crime. Such experimentation can however tum 
killing into nothing more than a new sin to be tested. Accordingly, The Daily Chronicle 
reviewer notes that Dorian's "sudden impulse [ ... ] to murder the painter" can be "artistically 
defended" as "a fresh development of his scheme for realising every phase of life-
experience" (Beckson 73). In contrast with speculations on the causes of Dorian's sins, to 
which aIl three main characters contributed, the reader must rely on the narrator's report of 
the killer's stream of consciousness alone to explain both the murder and the self-
destructive finale. Indeed, Basil cannot comment on the motives of his own unforeseen 
assassination and Lord Henry refuses any implication that his former protégé should be a 
criminal. 
Upon close reading, the narrator's account of the painter's end from the murderer's 
perspective seems to rule out a simple hedonistic experiment. Though he feels "strangely 
calm" once the deed is done, more than a "sudden impulse," as The Daily Chronicle 
reviewer puts it, dominates him beforehand (III 137, 300). An "uncontrollable feeling of 
hatred" towards his long-time friend and the "mad passions of a hunted animal" seize 
him (III 137,300). These violent emotions certainly do not sit weIl with Basil's valuation of 
good-natured Dorian, but they are equally remote from his new hedonist pose, which Lord 
Henry understands to be his true nature. In his constant quest for novel "sensations" to 
quench his "intellectuai curiosity," Dorian would voluntarily let "modes of thought [ ... ] 
reaIly alien to his nature" influence him until he felt he had "caught their color" (III 110, 
280). These include Roman Catholicism, mysticism, and studies in biological determinism. 
His nature does not dictate his thoughts: his curiosity for life leads him to seek other, 
"alien" frameworks. He also diligently studies' his reaction to different stimuli, seeking for 
instance to "elaborate a real psychology of perfumes" (III 112, 281). Dorian seems to have 
total command over this meticulous exploration of both thought and the senses' effects, 
which Seagroatt compares to a scientific endeavour (744, 748). How then could it 
degenerate into bloodshed? 
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This sense of mastery over one's thinking process - the "cool, calculating, 
conscienceless character, evolved 10gicaUy enough by Mr Wilde's 'New Hedonism'" that 
the reviewer evokes - runs contrary to the narrator's statement, at the beginning of the long 
descriptive chapter on new hedonism, that he has "almost entirely lost control" over his 
"nature" and its "changing fancies" (Beckson 73; III 105, 276). Wilde corrects the reviewer 
in a written reply published by the Daily Chronicle: Dorian, on the contrary, is "extremely 
impulsive" (CL 436). Furtherrnore, while the reviewer reads the young man as 
"conscienceless," Wilde dis credits the interpretation and c1aims that Dorian is "haunted" by 
"an exaggerated sense of conscience which mars his pleasures for him" (CL 436). Different 
passages within the text support both the author's and his critic's positions. Dorian thus 
seems to have at least two personalities one raging undemeath the co Id and calculating 
dominant one - an unsurprising fact given the ultimate imperative of new hedonism 
discussed in the beginning of the chapter: to know of all the past's experiences. 
Conscience from time to time erupts and disturbs the cool, calculated 
experimentation of new sensations. Once one acknowledges Dorian's dual personality, his 
plea to Basil - "Each of us has Heaven and HeU in him" shines in a different light (III 
135,299). He replies to the awe-struck painter who has just come to the realization that the 
object of his past adoration's soul has "the face of a satyr" and "the eyes of a devil" (III 
135, 299). Editors of The Picture of Dorian Gray Joseph Bristow and Michael Patrick 
Gillespie read the passage as an echo of Paradise Lost: "The mind is its own place, and in 
itself 1 Can make a Heaven of HeU, a Hell of Heaven" (1.254-255, qtd in III 420n135.26; 
Norton ed. 13ln3).68 However, John Milton's Satan is referring to the possibility of 
creating Heaven and HeU within one's mind, not to their proper existence within one's 
being. Dorian insists that he is neither simply the idealized figure to which his friend c1ung 
nor the hellish being he just discovered. The two nouns were only capitalized on the 
68 Isobel Murray incIudes no editorial note on the passage in the Oxford edition. 
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typescript, which gives less weight to an argument based on formaI resemblance. The 
distinction between the verbs "to have" and "to make" bring Dorian's the ory much closer to 
that of Stevenson's Jekyll (see Chapter 2) than to that of Milton's Satan, one in which 
competing characters cohabit within the mind. Such an interiorized battle can command a 
"wild gesture of despair," whereas on the contrary Satan's proposition offers hope (III 135, 
299). Because of the supernatural curse, the portrait bears alone the weight of Dorian's 
inner Hell while his inner Heaven glows on his face. 
There is no compound avatar in Dorian Gray, comparable to Dr Jekyll, who retains 
both parts of his nature while Mr Hyde is pure evil. Nevertheless, the portrait functions 
similarly to the evil alter ego: it is "an iconographical establishment of difference, 
illustrating self as other," as Rosemary Jackson very aptly describes (45). The difference is 
underscored physiognomically. Indeed, the natural "signs of age" but also the 
physiognomic "signs of sin," which should both mar Dorian's constitution, stain the portrait 
instead while the character retains his early adulthood freshness (III 106, 277). The 
displacement of the legible heralds of evil from the face to the portrait misleads many who 
took "that wonderful youth that seemed never to leave him" as a token of moral 
conduct (III 120, 287). As Brigit M. Marshall remarks in the introduction to her article on 
physiognomy and phrenology in Dorian Gray and Dracula (1897), evil is perhaps most 
frightening "in real-life" because it not detectable visually, as it is in Gothic novels (161). 
Dorian alone witnesses the hideousness of his soul, from which he can easily dissociate 
himself and mark as Other. 
Dorian chooses to materialize his conscience within the portrait in a rare moment of 
self-determination. He expressly pledges upon noticing the initial transformation that it 
shall be to him "the visible emblem of consciènce" (III 68, 246). In this capacity, it has had 
a decisive influence over all his cri minaI actions and not only the final blow.69 Whereas The 
69 The manuscript expressed a tidy symmetry: "Dorian Gray had been 'poisoned by a book and by a picture. 
Lord Henry had given him the one, and Basil Hal/ward had painted the other" (Ill 125, emphasis added). 
Wilde struck out the second sentence directly on the manuscript and the remainder of the italicized text on 
the typescript. 
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Daily Chronicle reviewer finds narrative justification in Basil's murder, he (or less 
likely she) argues that the portrait's. destruction, prompted "merely" by its apparent 
'insensibility' to Dorian's alleged good deed, is "inconsistent" with his "cool" and 
"calculating" pursuit of new hedonism (Beckson 73). Such a motivation is indeed 
unconvincing, but Wilde in his reply explains the act's deeper roots: "It is finally to get rid 
of the conscience that had dogged his steps from year to year that he destroys the 
picture" (CL 436). Wilde reaffirms this interpretation five years later during his first trial 
against the Marquess of Queensberry, father to his lover Lord Arthur Douglas (Holland 63). 
Dorian sought to do away with the terrible burden of conscience by destroying its "visible 
emblem." 
Given the motive behind Dorian's second violent attack, Basil's murder could be 
reinterpreted as a first attempt to kill conscience. The appalled painter's last words are 
indeed moralizing: "You have done enough evil in your life. My God! don't you see that 
accursed70 thing leering at us?" (III 136, 299). Basil directs the sinner's attention to the 
representation of his soul. On every encounter, he reminded his sitter, perhaps painfully, of 
his long lost innocence by clinging to an idealized moment of Dorian's existence, thought 
to be immortalized on canvas. The artist acts as conscience's disapproving voice - as the 
portrait provides its reproachful gaze - and must be removed in order for Dorian to enjoy 
his lifestyle with less remorse. The voice may be gone, but the gaze remains and must be 
destroyed as well. 
*** 
The text, especially its 1891 additions, off ers an additional, more eerie, explanation 
to both slaughters: insanity. In the thoughts running through Dorian's mind ·before he 
destroys the picture, and consequently himself, he as always lays the blame on others. He 
holds Basil and Alan Campbell - the unlucky scientist who commits suicide after having 
been recruited to coyer up the murderous deed - responsible for their own fate. Additional 
blame falls upon the painter for having produced his dreaded work of art: "It was the 
70 The typescript reads "damned." 
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portrait that had done everything" (lII 161, 355). The 20-chapter version offers more 
details on that which the portrait has "done." lndeed, it expressly becomes the instigator of 
Basil's murder: "Dorian Gray glanced at the picture, and suddenly an uncontrollable feeling 
of hatred for Basil Hallward came over him, as thaugh if had been suggested ta him by the 
image an the canvas, whispered inta his ear by thase grinning lips" (III 299, emphasis 
added). The added passage (in italics) tums suggestion into hallucination. In a strange 
reversaI, the "visible emblem of conscience" inspires crime. This decisive part of Dorian's 
excuse in murdering Basil has gone widely unnoticed within the academic community.71 
Dorian twice discharges himself of criminal responsibility by specifically invoking 
madness. Before killing himself, he blames rus friend's murder on "the madness of a 
moment" to which he had given an astrological origin immediately after the deed: "There 
had been a madness of murder in the air. Sorne red star had come too close to the earth" (lII 
161, 355; 139, 301). Isobel Murray, in her editorial notes, directs the reader to Pater's 
"Denys L'Auxerrois": "The planet Mars drew nearer to the earth than usual, hanging in the 
low sky like a fiery red lamp" (62; qtd. in Oxfard ed. 193). Mars is known to be the red 
planet, which does give the reference a certain relevance, but the context links the 
astronomical phenomenon to climate change and perhaps, though not expressly, to social 
upheaval: it bears no connection with murder. Ptolemy's Tetrabiblas nevertheless links 
Mars to violence in multiple forms (183). This Ancient astrologica1 treatise was twice 
translated into English during the first quarter of the nineteenth-century (Holden 203). It 
remained a reference weIl into the twentieth-century: William Butler Yeats (1865-1939) 
recommends it in a letter, asserting it is the source of aIl modem astrology (Saddlemyer 63). 
Furthermore, the Tetrabiblas also states that cornets, which can be assimilated to stars 
moving in the sky, "naturally produce the effects peculiar to Mars and to Mercury - wars, 
hot weather, disturbed conditions, and the accompaniments of these" (193). The "red star," 
71 Only two scholars have discussed the passage, with contradictory interpretations of agency. To Stephen 
Kem, it is "the painting itself' that acts and "miraculously urges him [Dorian] to commit murder" (317). 
In contrast, Guy Willoughby contends that the dreadful deed is bom of the protagonist's own reading: 
"Dorian is unable to review the awful messages of his portrait [and] finds, rather, his own distorted 
meanings in the picture which shames and horrifies Basil" (73). 
according to astrological lore, could thus have caused the "madness of murder" which 
Dorian invokes to shy away from criminal responsibility in Basil's death. 
82 
The aforementioned passage is the only reference to astrological influence. 
However, punctual references to madness are recurrent. For instance, in his love-Ietter to 
the already dead Sibyl, Dorian "accus[es] himself of madness" (III 73, 250). Folly first 
enters his thoughts when he notices the change in the portrait and attempts to address the 
puzzling problem rationally. He is quite convinced that "[i]t was not a mere fancy of his 
own," yet a trace of doubt remains (III 66, 245). He briefly fathoms that "that tiny scarlet 
speck that makes men mad" had "fallen upon his brain" due to "horrible night" he had 
spent (11168, 246). A speck is a "small spot of a different colour or substance to that of the 
material or surface upon which it appears" also "indicative of a defective, diseased, or 
faulty condition" (OED). Esther Rashkin very perceptively links this mark to an obsolete 
figurative use of 'worm,' often termed 'wild worm': "A whim or 'maggot' in the brain; a 
perverse fancy or desire; a streak of madness or insanity" (OED, qtd in 174). Sadly, she 
does not share her research process and surprisingly makes no reference to the preceding 
meaning in the Oxford English Dictionary, which is still in use and also of interest to 
Dorian Gray: "A grief or passion that preys stealthily on a man's heart or torments his 
conscience (like a worm in a dead body or a maggot in food); esp[ecially] the gnawing pain 
of remorse" (OED). Dorian's hypothesis regarding the "speck" is thus that a strange 
mixture of remorse and madness initiated the illusion of the portrait's transformation. 
Nonetheless, he rapidly reverts to his earlier position, recognizing the change's 
concreteness. Madness is nonetheless tightly connected to the portrait. 
Dorian's self-justification for moving the portrait evolves and bears witness to a 
growing paranoia. The apparition of the "touch of cruelty in the mouth" triggers its locking 
up (III 66, 245). As he initially notices the change, even before he feels threatened by his 
friends' eyes, he wonders if it will "become a monstrous72 and loathsome thing, to be 
hidden away in a locked room, to be shut out from the sunlight" (III 257). Ugliness would 
72 The 1890 version reads "hideous" (Ill 82). 
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make the painting unfit for public display within the marvellously decorated library, 
with its "cream-coloured silk blinds," its "blue-dragon bowl [ ... ] filled with sulphur-yellow 
roses," and its "luxuriously-cushioned couch" (III 66, 245; 71, 248; 72, 249). However, 
after he learns of Sibyl's suicide, Dorian starts to fear discovery rather than mere 
hideousness. 
When he fully understands the "horrible change" he noticed, Dorian grows 
distrustful, fearing his intimacy will be breached (Ill 72, 249). Scared someone will spy on 
his validation of the transformation, he locks the doors. The next day, Basil comes to visit 
and incidentally asks to see the portrait he has himself painted. As the artist gestures to 
remove the sere en and Dorian stops him with a "cry of terror": he is "trembling aIl 
over" (Ill 88, 262). He then resolves to remove his secret from aIl eyes except his own: 
"The portrait must be hidden away at aIl costs. [ ... ] It had been mad ofhim to have allowed 
the thing to remain,73 even for an hour, in a room to which any of his friends had 
access" (llI267, emphasis added). Had it really been mad, or is he becoming mad? Dorian 
indeed begins to display paranoid tendencies. The savage impulse to prote ct his secret 
reappears against Mr. Hubbard, the helpful frame-maker: "He felt ready to leap upon him 
and fling him to the ground if he dared to lift the gorgeous hanging that concealed the 
secret of his life" (Ill 1 00, 272). The safety Dorian's unalterable appearance affords him by 
evading physiognomic suspicion depends upon the portrait's etemal removal from the 
public eye. 
The prime suspect for a potential discovery is a background figure too close for 
comfort: Victor, the faithful butler. The young master is clearly unstable when he begins 
distrusting him: "When his servant entered, he looked at him steadfastly, and wondered if 
he had thought of peering behind the screen. The man was quite impassive, and waited for 
his orders. [ ... ] There was nothing to be afraid of, there. Yet he thought it best to be on his 
guard" (lll 94, 268). Wilde adds on the typescript, after Dorian has given his orders: "It 
73 The manuscript reads ''10 let it remain;" the typescript, "to have let the thing remain;" and the 1890 
version, "to have the thing remain" (III 93). 
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seemed to him that as the man left the room he peered74 in the direction of the screen. 
Or was that only his~5 fancy?" (III 94) Dorian is aware ofhis fear's potential excessiveness, 
as he suggests his "fancy" could be playing tricks on him. The paranoia nevertheless 
persists as he feels, once Victor has re-entered, that he "must be got rid of at once" because 
of a certain slyness and of his "thoughtful, treacherous eyes" (III 97, 270). The slippage 
from "thoughtful" to "treacherous" is noteworthy: Dorian's portrait the visible 
decrepitude ofhis own soul so preoccupies him that he cannot conceive that his entourage 
is not equally obsessed. 
There is no relief for the paranoid mind. Only once the moving men are downstairs, 
the door locked and the key in his pocket will Dorian believe he can feel safe: "No eye but 
his would ever see his shame" (III 100, 273). Nevertheless, as he retums downstairs, he 
starts wondering whether Victor had "wormed out" of the men the reason for which they 
had been called, for he would assuredly, believes the unstable rnaster, notice the painting's 
absence: "Perhaps sorne night he might find him creeping upstairs and trying to force the 
door of the room. lt was a horrible thing to have a spy in one's house" (III 101, 273). The 
delusion is particularly pervasive concerning Victor since the menace cornes from within, 
and thus seems even more threatening. The fear of getting caught also participates in 
Dorian's resolution to destroy the picture. lndeed, he surmises that it is the only "bit of 
evidence" left to prove his guilt in relation to Basil's murder (III 162, 356). Though no 
hallucination drives the young man to self-destruction, madness still participates in the 
homicide in the form of paranoia. 
74 The 1891 version reads "his eyes wandered" (111268). 
7 5 The 1891 version reads "merely his own" (111268). 
Conclusion 
Close reading and literary genealogy enable an interpretation of Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein as a criminal narrative. It relies on two competing œtiologies of crime. The 
first draws on Johann Kaspar Lavater's physiognomic principles. The second constructs a 
psychosocial argument in the line of Friedrich Schiller's Der Verbrecher aus Verlorene 
Ehre, which earns it a place, in my opinion, in the criminal as Titan corpus of Theodore 
Ziolkowski's typology. Additional connections with the criminal narrative can be traced by 
referring to an ancestor within popular culture: seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
criminal biographies. Further inquiry into differences between Frankenstein's first and third 
editions, guided by Shelley's journals and letters, might determine to what extent the 
criminal angle was intentional. 
Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde functions as a 
detective story in which explanations regarding Edward Hyde's nature, behaviour, and 
relation to Jekyll supersede each other as the narrative unfolds additional clues. The main 
investigator, Gabriel Utterson, formulates three successive hypotheses involving biological 
atavism, idiosyncratic dislike, and Satanism. In the final chapter, Dr. Henry Jekyll's 
autobiographical perspective on Hyde moves from identification - he forms part of his 
human self - to rejection - he constitutes an inhuman Other. In the process, he pronounces 
himself morally insane. The entire tale bears witness to Stevenson's fascination with double 
lives, an effervescent topic in psychopathological research at the time. Further comparison 
with the Scotsman's other devil stories might give more depth to the overarching 
theological descriptions ofthe evil self. 
Close reading and comparative analysis with social discourse uncovers multiple and 
varied understandings and explanations of criminality in The Picture of Dorian Gray. On a 
meta-narrative level, Lord Henry Wotton contrastingly describes crime as a lower-class 
means to liberate one's self from social constraints - as is art to the higher classes, - but 
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also as a necessity in the face of poverty and a result of punishment. He refuses to take 
the blame Basil Hallward lays on him for Dorian's corruption, claiming he has but 
exposed the young man's true self. The latter also refuses accountability, invoking 
deterministic influences emanating from his character and his ancestry, both biological and 
philosophical, as well as madness. Analysis of the James Vane subplot added to the 1891 
edition might reconcile Lord Henry's class-based discourse on criminality with the 
narrative. 
*** 
AIl three novels question physiognomic legibility. Indeed, the creature offers its 
own discourse to counter Frankenstein's reading (and narrative structure favours its view); 
Utterson's three hypotheses fail to unravel the basic mystery that Hyde and Jekyll are the 
same person; and thè fantastic transposition unto the portrait of the bodily markings of 
Dorian's age and sins renders his physiognomy misleading. Notwithstanding its 
shortcomings, the pseudo-science concretely affects the narratives, through negative 
prejudice - drowning Frankenstein's sympathy for his creature and excluding it from 
society; through physiological reactions - making Hyde's onlookers' blood run cold; and 
through positive prejudice - immunizing Dorian against scandaI and enabling him to 
maintain his deviant life. 
The criminals' alterity grows more subjective from one work ,to the next. No 
character doubts that Frankenstein's creature is inhuman: even itself does not vindicate 
inclusion into humankind as a species. It is completely Other. A deformity aIl observe 
marks Hyde as objectively abnormal. However, only Utterson and Jekyll state expressly 
not only metaphorically - that he could be inhuman. The alter egos share their memory and 
handwriting, but exist in distinct embodiments. Self and Other cohabit and commingle until 
the original compound person gradually repudiates its evil personality. In Dorian Gray, 
there is only one body: the Other is a pictorial representation. Nonetheless, the criminal 
protagonist strives to reject responsibility, ultimately blaming his portrait and its maker. In 
sum, the criminal gets closer and closer to one's self. 
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Why do they km? If the monster is to be trusted, because its maker abandoned it 
in an inhospitable world in which, despite repeated efforts, it could not belong, the 
frustration inciting it to revoIt. If this discourse is but Satan-like rhetoric, it slaughters 
simply because of its demonic nature. Hyde murders because Jekyll released him from 
conscience's grip. Similarly, Dorian assassinates Basil and destroys his portrait, 
unintentionally committing suicide, because in his madness he wanted to kill conscience. 
While Shelley offers a counter-narrative to her leading character's assumptions that the 
criminal is pure evil, the two fin-de-siècle Gothic novels reaffirm the powerfully 
frightening and appalling correspondence. 
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